The history of the Islamic Republic of Iran—established in 1979 following the revolution that overthrew Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi—is marked by a dense sequence of developments that have progressively altered its political and institutional configuration.
These changes, however, have only sporadically been recognized by Western analyses, which have instead tended to perpetuate a more functional and instrumental stereotype based on the image of a monolithic, highly verticalized religious autocracy. While such a characterization was broadly accurate during the first decade of the Islamic Republic, it has undergone a profound transformation since 1989.
The revolution itself, commonly defined as “Islamic”, was in reality the product of a far broader and more heterogeneous convergence of ideological and political currents, which only at a later stage coalesced—more or less spontaneously—into a unified movement under religious leadership.
The most significant aspect of the institutional evolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is therefore connected to its post-Khomeinist transition, following the death of the founder of the new revolutionary Iran in 1989. This phase produced two particularly consequential effects.
The first was a profound discontinuity in the conception of the leadership. From Ruhollah Khomeini’s absolute authority, leadership shifted—facilitated by a constitutional reform—towards a figure of guarantee and cohesion under Ali Khamenei, who progressively assumed the role of primus inter pares. The Supreme Leader thus retained ultimate decision-making authority, but within a system in which that authority must be exercised through the reconciliation of positions within a broad and heterogeneous political and ideological assembly.
The second effect concerned generational discontinuity. The first generation of power—the clerical cohort that rose through the revolutionary experience—proved unable to reproduce itself within the clerical establishment. Instead, it designated the Sepah-e Pasdaran (the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or IRGC), an institution of military origin, as its successor. As a result, the IRGC became the institutional backbone of the transitional phase.
The 37 years following Khomeini’s death have therefore consolidated the institutional architecture of the Islamic Republic within a system profoundly different from that of the Khomeinist era, characterized by an increasingly evident polarization of ideological positions and a simultaneous need to define mechanisms for managing political power through sharing and consensus.
In this way, the second Supreme Leader, while remaining the ultimate decision-maker, has lost the defining characteristic of being the sole decision-maker, having to adapt his role to that of a highly heterogeneous and conflictual political context. In this context, first-generation figures have progressively diminished in number for demographic reasons, while second-generation actors have become pervasive across every institutional, economic, and military body.
Within this process of transformation, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has progressively assumed a central role, evolving into a genuine “clearing house” of Iranian politics. The Council brings together, within a single forum of debate, not only the country’s different generational and institutional components but also the heterogeneous ideological landscape that shapes the often-shifting orientations of the Islamic Republic, thereby enabling the Supreme Leader to assess their respective balances and weights.
What emerges from the Council’s deliberations is subsequently transformed into policy orientation by the Supreme Leader, who thus formalizes a common line constructed through the pursuit of the broadest possible consensus within the Council itself.
Despite this evolution, Western perceptions of Iran’s political system have struggled to move beyond the stereotype of a continuing Khomeinism, attributing to the Supreme Leader a role and a degree of power that he has, in reality, no longer possessed for some time.
This rigid interpretation of Iran as a monolithic system has prevented both the United States and the majority of the European states from formulating a more targeted and effective strategy for managing relations with Iran, while simultaneously failing to grasp the fundamental elements of transformation within the country’s domestic politics.
The consequences of this analytical deficiency have become particularly acute, as international dynamics between 2024 and the present have altered the traditional balance with Iran. The crossing of the “red line” of direct military confrontation with the United States and Israel, combined with the uncertainty surrounding succession to an ageing Khamenei, has intensified speculation regarding Iran’s future. These interpretations are often detached from local dynamics and increasingly influenced by the aspirations of a highly polarized diaspora, particularly in the context of ever more frequent manifestations of social dissent.
A more calibrated assessment of the political and social balances within the Islamic Republic, by contrast, allows for the identification of scenarios that are more realistically grounded in the country’s internal dynamics.
A necessary premise for such analysis is the recognition of the profound crisis affecting the Islamic revolutionary institutions that emerged after the fall of the monarchy. The first generation of power is now represented by only a few surviving figures, whose ideological positions are no longer compatible with those of the second generation, let alone with those of the third generation—drawn from the vast number of youth—which shares no ideological affinity with either the original revolutionary generation or the subsequent military-derived cohort.
Aspirations for profound change are therefore palpable and widespread, albeit articulated through models that are often highly diverse and mutually conflicting.
Youth constituencies demand democracy and freedom, call for the overthrow of theocracy, yet remain unable to articulate a unified leadership or, above all, a shared political program. As a result, they consistently fail to transform protests into revolutions and are thus readily contained by the regime’s well-honed repressive apparatus.
The second generation—numerically far smaller than the third within the country’s demographic pyramid—paradoxically shares the need to overcome the theocratic system, though for a different reason: its own interest in emerging at the apex of a new power infrastructure and securing its legitimacy.
Although constituted as a power bloc largely drawn from the Pasdaran structure, the second generation should no longer be understood in a purely military context. Over the past four decades, the IRGC system has evolved substantially, assuming vast economic, social, and administrative dimensions, thereby creating a power infrastructure that can be described as a “state within the state.”
The transition from the first to the second generation, long underway, was for many years characterized by an implicit understanding that the theocratic system would be overcome in a gradual and non-confrontational manner. This equilibrium, however, has been profoundly altered over the past two years by regional dynamics and their impact on the internal balances of the Islamic Republic. The substantial downsizing of security strategies—following the marked weakening of the principle of “forward defense” through the so-called “Axis of Resistance”—the return of conflict within national borders, and the demonstration of the system’s evident vulnerability have generated a broad debate on the need to revise the main directions of policy and security.
This debate has revealed clear contradictions and deep divergences, particularly between the first and second generations, highlighting how the former’s approach is now obsolete and no longer capable of ensuring national security, while prompting the latter to adopt a far more assertive stance towards the Supreme Leader himself, further eroding his authority.
In this context, it is therefore evident that Iran is preparing to confront a new and unavoidable phase of profound transformation. Identifying its likely outcome, however, is more complex, although three scenarios currently appear plausible.
The first scenario envisages a temporary continuation of the current equilibrium, which would nonetheless likely be followed in the short term by a renewed phase of discontent and protest, further intensified by the memory of the violent repression of January 2026. In this scenario, protest movements would, for the first time, succeed in expressing a shared leadership and political program, transforming demonstrations into a revolutionary process no longer opposed by the military apparatus. The collapse of the theocratic institutions, together with the Pasdaran power structure, would open the possibility of a democratic transition, creating a context within which Iranian society’s political aspirations could be progressively regenerated.
The second scenario involves external military intervention by the United States and Israel, aimed at provoking institutional collapse and facilitating the emergence of a revolutionary movement. Such intervention would risk being perceived by the regime as an existential threat, prompting the adoption of all possible security prerogatives, particularly to prevent the emergence of any form of social dissent. The spread of violence could, however, trigger an escalation capable of fragmenting confrontation across the territory, opening the concrete possibility of widespread and prolonged internal conflict across much of the country.
The third and final scenario envisages an internal replacement at the apex of the institutional system, led by the second generation. This option would most plausibly materialize upon the death of the Supreme Leader (whether from natural causes or as a result of external intervention), with powers temporarily assigned—pursuant to the Constitution—to an emergency governing council. At that point, the difficulty of identifying and electing a new Supreme Leader would become apparent, both because of the lack of credible candidates and the overt opposition of the second and third generations, thereby creating the opportunity for a new constitutional reform. This would, in effect, replicate the experience of 1989 following Khomeini’s death, when constitutional reform radically altered the role and figure of the Supreme Leader.
Such a scenario would steer Iran towards a strengthening of the presidential system and, presumably, a reduction of the clergy’s role to a largely symbolic one, thereby sanctioning the full legitimation of the second generation as the new authority controlling the institutions.
This transformation, however, would produce a form of authoritarianism with a strong military imprint, frustrating any democratic aspirations of the Iranian people. The removal of the theocratic framework might nonetheless allow the second generation to abandon the traditional anti-American ideological positions of its predecessor, opening the door to compromise with the United States on both political and economic fronts. This would create a different context in which to ensure the continuity of the system, albeit with a limited number of high-profile removals at the top. In short, this would be a case of change without transformation: visible adjustments designed to preserve the system rather than reform it, satisfying all but the majority of Iranian society.
Cover photo: Iranians gather while blocking a street during a protest in Tehran, Iran on January 9, 2026. (Photo by Mahsa / Middle East Images via AFP)
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