Analyses
Middle East
In an article published in January in Foreign Affairs, two researchers analyze the extreme volatility of the current global order, arguing that in the age of personalist politics key foreign policy decisions—especially those involving great powers and nuclear-armed states—depend largely on the whims and obsessions of individual leaders, rather than on stable institutions or long-term strategies. In this new global order, instability is the norm, because decisions no longer correspond to long-term strategic expectations and interests, but are the result of impulsive choices unconstrained by institutional considerations and commitments. This dynamic is illustrated by what is not happening in Gaza, which has officially entered the ‘phase two’ of the twenty-point peace plan launched by US President Donald Trump—a plan that was supposed to ensure the Strip’s demilitarization, a technocratic government, and the long-awaited beginning of reconstruction.
  • Alaa Badr 30 March 2026
    Writing about post-revolutionary intellectuals in Egypt and beyond, I once borrowed Zeina Halabi’s notion of the “aftermath.” An aftermath of a Naksa twice removed—first the 1967 defeat, then that of 2011—even if the content of critique differed greatly. Can one extend the definition of the 2011 aftermath to the post-October 7 world? Certainly, if not only due to their belonging to the same historical period, then it is because they share ontological and epistemological roots. The post-October 7 can be described as the aftermath of the aftermath, a time suspended, where the old (tools of critiques and references of universalism) is dead, and the new is stillborn—a present that is perpetually “condemned to become.”
  • Vittorio Sandalli 27 March 2026
    While international attention is focused on the war with Iran—due to its implications for the global energy market and the threat of a potentially devastating escalation—fighting between Pakistan and Afghanistan has resumed with unprecedented intensity in the adjacent region. Such a clash would have been unthinkable when the Taliban returned to power on August 15, 2021, reestablishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, in part thanks to Islamabad’s support.
  • Ramin Jahanbegloo 12 March 2026
    What, then, can humanity do in the face of this lack of common sense on both sides? Perhaps the only way to stop this war and the spread of violence across the Middle East is a shared commitment to peace and to the value of human life, whether Muslim, Jewish, or Christian. We need a minimal morality that could inspire opposition to Iranian tyranny, alongside a strong turn toward common sense—on that recalls the American tradition of civic virtue: the dedication of citizens to the common good and placing public duty above self-interest. Believe it or not, Iranian civil society today is closer to some of the values of the American Revolution than some of those who work in Washington, D.C. and wage wars to expand their capacity to make war. If the 2003 war in Iraq was unjust, the war against Iran is a war against common sense—and against the civic virtues of the Iranian people.
  • Pasquale Annicchino 24 February 2026
    The recent large-scale deployment of U.S. forces in the Middle East and Europe has led many analysts to question whether a military intervention in Iran is on the horizon—and what its short- and long-term consequences might be. An action capable of bringing about the collapse of the Islamic Republic would open political and religious scenarios with global ramifications.
  • Anne-Marie McManus 29 January 2026
    In a recent essay published by Reset Dialogues on Civilizations, Elizabeth Suzanne Kassab called on scholars to attend closely to the forms and concerns that shape contemporary Arab thought, locating its newness in the uprisings of 2011 and the ruptures that followed. In his response, included in the broader dossier, Samer Frangie cautioned that the category of “Arab thought” functions as a “historiographical device,” one that has brought together “dispersed, contradictory, and elusive acts of” intellectual production under a shared political horizon. He thus reorients the question towards periodization: is it still meaningful—and for whom—to reinvigorate this category as a way of making sense of the present?
  • Pegah Zohouri 21 January 2026
    The current wave of protests in Iran began on December 27, 2025, in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar, where shopkeepers demonstrated against the collapse of the rial, the soaring value of the US dollar, and the rapidly rising cost of living. What initially appeared as economically driven unrest quickly expanded beyond the capital. Universities emerged as early hubs of mobilization, but more significantly, protests spread to provincial towns and smaller cities, where inflationary pressures are most acutely felt. Within weeks, the unrest had assumed a truly national character, encompassing a growing number of provinces and cutting across social classes.
  • Renzo Guolo 5 January 2026
    The protests over Iran’s economic crisis are putting the regime under severe strain. They risk acting as a detonator for an already highly unstable mix: the heavy impact of sanctions, the collapse of the rial to historic lows against the dollar, and an unprecedented energy and water crisis. These factors, compounded by systemic inefficiencies, are driving inflation to around 40 percent year on year. Taking to the streets are Tehran’s bazaar merchants, a group long decisive in determining whether power in Iran holds or collapses.
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