The recent large-scale deployment of U.S. forces in the Middle East and Europe has led many analysts to question whether a military intervention in Iran is on the horizon—and what its short- and long-term consequences might be. An action capable of bringing about the collapse of the Islamic Republic would open political and religious scenarios with global ramifications. This line of inquiry no longer feels like a purely intellectual exercise in light of the warfare of June 2025, carried out under Operation Rising Lion, during which Israeli and U.S. forces struck at the heart of Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure. In the aftermath, the regime in Tehran violently suppressed the massive street protests that erupted across the country. What systemic repercussions would follow a new, targeted operation—this time aimed at the regime’s top leadership?
Whether—and how—a definitive crisis might unfold remains an open question. From the standpoint of the relationship between law and religion, however, a potential collapse of the regime could trigger an unprecedented crisis, with global repercussions.
Today, Shiism accounts for roughly 15–20 percent of global Islam and for nearly the entirety of Iranian Islam (about 90 percent of the population). There are, however, several other countries with significant Shiite communities, including Azerbaijan, Iraq, Bahrain, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Yemen. Shiite populations are also present in states such as Pakistan, India, and Tajikistan.
In this context, Iran has aspired to assume a leadership role in the Shiite world through influence operations in Lebanon, via Hezbollah, and in Yemen, through its support for the Houthi rebels. Syria long served as the strategic hub for Tehran’s regional projection; however, the collapse of the Assad regime and the end of Alawite dominance have undermined this hegemony. Nor should one underestimate Tehran’s growing influence in Africa, or the presence of Hezbollah operational cells in Venezuela.
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 marked a watershed in the Shiite awakening, accelerating the shift away from Arab nationalism toward identity-based political movements. The subsequent fusion of state institutions and the clergy helped produce a “bureaucracy of faith,” deeply embedded in the levers of power—especially within the security apparatus.
Should the Islamic Republic fall, this ruling class would likely face political and social purges, pushing the clergy toward a forced return to a more academic and “quietist” role. Deprived of the state’s material backing and coercive power, what would become of Qom, the spiritual heart of Shi’a Islam, and its complex institutional architecture? Qom is not merely a holy city; it is the beating heart of Shia religious education worldwide—the true ideological and theological nerve center of the Khomeinist revolution.
This would open up a competition among religious centers, potentially favoring a renewed alignment with the Iraqi tradition of Najaf. Distant from Iran’s hierarchical model, Najaf preserves a more horizontal production of Shiite knowledge, guided by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. His vision rejects theocratic rule, advocating instead a form of popular sovereignty in which religious authority does not govern but acts as a guardian of ethical and moral values.
Al-Sistani’s model stands in contrast to Tehran’s authoritarian approach, which relies on the repressive apparatus to shape society. For al-Sistani, just governance cannot be the product of force; rather, it must emerge organically from a civic consciousness that matures independently of state control.
This model, developed over the years, would likely be better suited to a global projection of the Shiite world in the event of a collapse of the Islamic Republic in Iran. The openness of al-Sistani’s approach, and its distance from an emphasis on the state’s coercive apparatus, make it compatible with pluralistic national contexts in which Shiism coexists with other religious traditions, as in Lebanon or Iraq itself.
Such an approach could, for instance, make a substantial contribution to easing relations between Sunnis and Shiite minorities in the Gulf monarchies, where Shiites are often viewed as agents in the service of Tehran. By contrast, the “Najaf model” would struggle to replace the high-impact global training network that Iran has helped build with the aim of exporting the revolution through certain institutions, such as Al-Mustafa International University, already sanctioned by the U.S. State Department for being identified as a training hub for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
At the same time, one cannot ignore the scenario that would open up in the event of a succession dispute involving the elderly Ayatollah of Najaf. Given his advanced age, his eventual passing would introduce yet another variable into an already complex landscape.
The institutional collapse of Tehran would likely turn the claim of a fusion between religion and politics into a spectacular historical failure, forcing the clergy of Qom into a profound reassessment of its own identity. The breakdown of a central authority sustained by a monopoly on force would inevitably open the door to scenarios of deep instability.
Yet such a power vacuum could also offer an opportunity to redefine Shiism’s global role, fostering a new balance between faith and politics. This process—better suited to pluralistic contexts—could draw renewed energy from the recovery of modernist intellectuals and theologians who have thus far been marginalized by the regime.
At the same time, one cannot ignore the possibility that, with the disappearance of Iran’s centralized model, large segments of the militias—deprived of ideological guidance and political direction—could turn the Shiite world into yet another case of politico-religious balkanization, heightening the risk of internal conflicts over the control of resources and shrines.
Ultimately, setting aside developments that no one today can predict with any precision, the possible collapse of the Islamic Republic would likely bear on a central issue in the relationship between religion and politics (not only in Iran): the problem of the “statization” of religious faith. Among the possible scenarios, a renewed and growing influence from Najaf could help unlock the pluralism inherent in the religious sphere—and in the Muslim world in particular—rooted more deeply in diverse national contexts. The result could be a reinvigorated faith, better equipped to confront the challenges of modernity, albeit amid countless difficulties.
Pasquale Annicchino is a senior assistant professor of law at the University of Foggia, Italy.
Cover photo: Pilgrims and clergymen walk across the courtyard of the Fatima Masumeh holy shrine in the religious Shiite Muslim city of Qom, some 130 kilometres south of the capital, on June 9, 2013. (Photo by Behrouz MEHRI / AFP)
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