Two years after October 7, the Middle East is undergoing a profound transformation. Israeli assertiveness, Iran’s weakening influence, and the reshaping of al-Sharaa’s Syria are redefining the regional balance, while fragile truces and new hierarchies of power reveal a landscape still in flux. In this context, French political scientist and leading expert on political Islam, Olivier Roy, reflects for Reset DOC on the region’s prospects, the deadlock of the Palestinian question, and the evolving relationship between Israel and its neighbors.
In a previous interview with Reset DOC, one year ago, you said that the October 7 attack happened because Hamas wanted to bring Israel back to the negotiating table. What do you think of the agreement that has since emerged?
It’s more a ceasefire than an agreement; nothing is really set for future negotiations. Hamas had no choice, but it is not defeated. The key issue is disarmament—and clearly, Hamas has kept its weapons. Israel, meanwhile, is deeply divided. The extreme right, now in power, had no choice but to sign under American pressure. Netanyahu had to comply. Yet they do not want peace with Hamas. The far right remains committed to the idea of a Greater Israel, whether in the Jordan Valley or in Gaza. Their goal is a war of attrition against the Palestinian civilian population—to force them to leave or surrender completely. For them, a Palestinian state is entirely out of the question. Still, that remains the official aim of the U.S. administration, which creates a contradiction. In any case, a Palestinian state seems almost impossible under current conditions: there is no viable territory, no safe space for Palestinians. We are in a stalemate, and the only thing that might shift the situation is the balance of power.
Do you think the ceasefire will hold?
Neither Hamas nor Netanyahu seems ready for a genuine political settlement; both sides are buying time. For Israel’s extreme right, the outcome is mixed: a short-term failure—they have neither crushed Hamas nor destroyed Iran’s nuclear program—but a long-term gain. As I said, their goal is a war of attrition, and that process is already underway. A ceasefire may hold, but the population is starving—that’s exactly what is happening now.
So, both Hamas and the Israeli government seem to be taking time, prolonging this first phase of the truce…
For Hamas, the choice is either to continue as things are or to surrender. The relationship between its political and military wings remains unclear—whether it’s simply a division of roles or a genuine difference of views, we don’t know. But for the military leadership, the options are stark: continuation or capitulation. There is no middle ground.
Do you think total disarmament of Hamas is possible?
No. No other external army will disarm Hamas—not the Egyptians, not the Americans, no one. The only alternative would be a political settlement in which Hamas agrees to disarm, though that seems highly unlikely. They might sign such an agreement, but they would not honor it. Without a genuine settlement, Hamas will continue to hold weapons and maintain control over at least part of Palestinian civil society.
Hamas’s leadership has been largely decimated, while Fatah remains weak and lacks credibility. What prospects are there from the Palestinian side?
The Palestinian Authority has no legitimacy—it is corrupt and inefficient. And Israel has done everything to produce precisely this situation. Hamas, on the other hand, is an Islamist and military organization. No one—not the Arabs, not the Americans—would accept handing the keys of a future Palestinian state to Hamas. It’s simply impossible.
So we’re in a dead end. Some suggest that freeing Marwan Barghouti could change things. Perhaps, he’s respected, maybe even capable of uniting Palestinians. But he’s just one man; you can’t build a government around a single person. In the end, Israel has succeeded in making a viable Palestinian state impossible.
So you don’t see any positive prospects—even considering the role of the Palestinian Authority as outlined in Trump’s plan?
Imposing a Palestinian state on Israel would require enormous pressure from the United States—and Trump will not do that. His goal is limited to maintaining a ceasefire, nothing more.
What about the West Bank? Trump has ruled out Israeli annexation. Can this stop the “Greater Israel” plan?
Trump and the Israelis are not operating on the same timeline. Trump thinks in weeks or months; the Israelis plan in years—five, ten, fifteen ahead. They are already preparing for the post-Trump era. Their strategy is wearing down Palestinian civil society and making any political settlement unsustainable. To Trump they say, “yes, yes,” pause briefly, avoid major escalation—and then simply wait.
In last year’s interview, you noted that the divide between Shia and Sunni Muslims was overriding hostility toward Israel. Is that still the case today?
When I spoke of the Shia side, I meant Hezbollah and Iran—not Shia populations as a whole. The main difference from last year is that the so-called Shia axis has been defeated: Hezbollah, Bashar al-Assad, and Iran have all suffered military setbacks. There is no longer a Shia front capable of confronting Israel.
On the Sunni side, there is sympathy for the Palestinians, but no real political or military support. In that sense, nothing has changed—no one is willing to fight for the Palestinians, not even individuals. There are a few isolated attacks, but nothing significant. Yes, there are demonstrations in places like Morocco and Indonesia, but they lead nowhere. The rapprochement with Israel is on hold for now, but it will resume sooner or later.
Two years after October 7, Israel appears more assertive in the region. As you mentioned, Iran’s influence has waned and there’s a “new” Syria. What kind of Middle East do you see emerging?
Pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism are dead. The region is now defined by national interests. In Saudi Arabia, the shift toward Saudi nationalism is clear—the same in Egypt, and in Syria, which is pursuing its own national agenda. Assad is seeking some form of accommodation with Israel; he is not supporting the Palestinians and is under Israeli pressure, including through Israel’s leverage over the regional drug trade.
Lebanon, meanwhile, has a narrow window to reassert itself as a functioning nation-state. So we are entering a phase where the Middle East is made up of nation-states, without Shia or Sunni “axes.” Israel, with its overwhelming military power, enjoys almost free rein—at least in the long term. The question for Saudi Arabia and others is whether to move ahead with normalization with Israel or to try forming a new coalition—not to confront Israel, but to contain it.
Israel claims that the Middle East has become more secure. Do you also see it as such or as more stable?
The region is not stable—everything remains fragile. In Lebanon, it’s unclear whether the current government, which is doing its best, can contain Hezbollah or whether the national army can assert control. In Syria, it’s uncertain whether Assad can reach an understanding with the Kurds and the Alawites. So no, the region is not more stable. For Israel, however, it is more secure—they have the upper hand in military terms. Iran no longer poses a serious threat. So yes, Israel is secure—but the rest of the region remains deeply unstable.
Cover photo: The occupation army closes the center of Hebron and allows settlers to storm an ancient tomb under the pretext of Jewish occasions on Beersheba Street in the center of Hebron, August 3, 2025. (Photo by MOSAB SHAWER / Middle East Images via AFP)
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