The world seems to have taken notice of Yemen—and of the strategic importance of the Red Sea—only after the outbreak of the Gaza crisis, when the Houthis began targeting commercial shipping transiting the area. Yet the events that have unfolded over the past months show that the Houthis are now a deeply rooted reality in Yemen’s own history: a force that controls roughly a quarter of the country, administers its territory efficiently, extracts resources from available fields, manufactures its own missiles and drones with reduced reliance on Iranian supplies, and continues to indoctrinate and recruit in order to expand its ranks and advance its political vision.
While operating within Iran’s broader “axis of resistance,” but pursuing an agenda of its own, the Houthis have succeeded in diverting a large share of commercial maritime traffic away from the Red Sea, forcing the United States and Europe to resort to military action. At the same time, they have been able to negotiate with Washington an end to airstrikes in exchange for refraining from attacks on U.S. vessels. The territory under Houthi control has, in effect, become a state-like entity, albeit one that remains unrecognized.
The anti-Israeli actions undertaken at the outbreak of the Gaza crisis should be read not only as a kind of “obligatory act” by Iran’s allies, but also as a show of strength and resolve, and as a declaration of intent to become a key—and potentially dominant—player in Yemen’s future, in the Red Sea region, and in the complex web of relationships shaped by the long-running, almost century-old conflict surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian question.
The Gaza crisis and its spillover into the southern Red Sea offered the movement an extraordinary opportunity to expand and showcase the operational capabilities of Ansar Allah (Arabic for “Supporters of God,” the name of the Houthi movement), which might otherwise have remained confined to what was, in relative terms, a secondary arena within the intricate mosaic of Middle Eastern power balances.
The course of the war against the Saudi-led coalition, and the actions of its various protagonists, have thus led to the emergence of areas of opposing influence and supremacy over both territory and population in Yemen. These zones are neither formally nor precisely defined and remain in constant flux.
The political map of present-day Yemen shows the internationally recognized government based in the governorate of Hadramout—the country’s largest, located in the east and rich in oil—home to the port of Mukallah and the international airports of Seiyun and al-Rayyan; in al-Mahra, the second-largest governorate, situated at Yemen’s far eastern edge on the border with Oman, where Saudi forces are also deployed; and in Shabwa, where the Balhaf liquefied natural gas plant is located, one of the country’s most important economic assets, occupied by the United Arab Emirates in 2016 and subsequently shut down.
Control is divided between the government and the Houthis in the governorate of Marib, about 170 kilometers east of Sana’a, an area rich in hydrocarbons and therefore fiercely contested for many months during the fighting; and in the Taiz region in the southwest, where the government holds the densely populated provincial capital of the same name, while the Houthis control the city of al-Hawban to the east, home to industrial activities that generate roughly 70 percent of the province’s total revenue for the group.
The Houthis control the northwestern governorates, starting with the Sa’da region, as well as the capital Sana’a, the governorate of Dhamar in the central western part of the country, and Ibb in the southwest. With the exception of limited districts held by government forces, they also control the strategic Hodeida coastline, including the port city of the same name, which is the most important Red Sea maritime hub. Finally, they hold most of the governorates of al-Jawf, along the border with Saudi Arabia, as well as Hajjah and al-Bayda.
Emerging forcefully from the war, the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC), established in 2017 and backed by the United Arab Emirates, controls the entire governorate of Aden, including its port, the country’s main harbor. It also claims the strategic Soqotra archipelago, southeast of Yemen in the Indian Ocean, which is in fact occupied by the Emiratis; shares control of the governorate of Abyan with the internationally recognized government; and maintains a military presence in the governorates of al-Dali’ and Lahij in southwestern Yemen. From these positions, and with Emirati support, the STC nurtures the ambition of reconstituting the former South Yemen.
Developments of the kind described cannot be ruled out within the current, loosely structured partition of the country, and they risk prompting continual reinterpretations of the situation, altering the informal tripartite division imposed by the outcome of the war. If this tripartition were to hold, it is highly likely that a familiar pattern would reemerge: a northern Yemen ruled by the Houthis, and a southern Yemen in which separatist aspirations would probably consolidate.
The fragmented and often feuding forces aligned with the internationally recognized government—now led by a Presidential Council—would then have to accept secession or attempt to negotiate a far-reaching autonomy for the south, assuming they are not themselves absorbed into a new southern state. It is difficult, in fact, to envisage a more complex partition of the country inspired by the federal constitution once approved by the National Dialogue, and later swept away by the war.
The Houthis would then have to reckon with other actors: those linked to what remains of the republican camp; those rooted in the legacy of the former independent southern state; and those tied to the country’s diverse tribal identities. That is, unless the Houthis were to settle for the territories they currently control and, on the margins of whatever the ultimate consequences of the Gaza crisis may be—or of pragmatic power-sharing arrangements—the “proxy war” risks continuing, perhaps in different forms, as a purely internal civil conflict.
The overall postwar reconfiguration of Yemen will continue to be shaped by the influence of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, both intent on extracting some return from the resources invested in the war and already effectively positioned to do so. The United Arab Emirates wields major influence over the future of southern Yemen: it already controls the ports of Aden and Mukallah (the latter in Hadramout) and has imposed substantial control over the island of Soqotra, which risks being transformed from a haven of biodiversity into a major logistical and military hub—one that would further expand the thalassocratic empire Abu Dhabi is building.
The Emiratis have also begun establishing an air base on the island of Mayyun, located in the middle of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a strategic foothold fully consistent with their aim of extending and consolidating a network of control over waters and coastlines crucial to trade, maritime security, and broader regional stability. Saudi Arabia, for its part, now a powerful actor in al-Mahra, has consolidated patronage ties with local tribes and launched major development projects at the ports of al-Ghayda and Nishtun, seeking to create an outlet for its oil and avoid dependence on passage through the Strait of Hormuz.
If confirmed by the outcomes of ongoing processes—and not overturned by the latest developments—this positioning will have a significant impact on postwar Yemen. Turkey and Qatar have also entered the picture, driven by their rivalry with Saudi Arabia and by President Erdoğan’s “Ottoman” ambitions, in coordination with the local al-Islah party, which is backed by Ankara and Doha. These three actors share the goal of weakening Riyadh and of fostering in Yemen a third force aligned with Turkey and Qatar.
If these ambitions were to materialize, they would generate friction in southern Yemen with the United Arab Emirates, which is likewise intent on controlling those regions. A Turkish presence along Yemen’s Red Sea coast would in fact give Ankara leverage over the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—especially when combined with Turkey’s positioning in the Horn of Africa—a prospect that the Emirati base on Mayyun is most likely designed to counter.
The situation described above—relatively well defined until last December—now risks being upended by very recent developments. In recent weeks, the separatist STC has carried out significant military advances in the regions of Hadramout and al-Mahra, threatening the influence Riyadh exerts there.
If these moves are not resolved through negotiation—perhaps in an effort to avoid a delicate proxy confrontation between Saudi Arabia, which controls those regions and backs the internationally recognized government, and the United Arab Emirates, a strong supporter of the STC—a new conflict could erupt between separatist and unionist factions, entirely independent of the Houthi issue, potentially triggering a proxy war between the Gulf’s two leading powers.
It is possible that such an outcome may ultimately be avoided, but the most recent signals do not point clearly in that direction. Between 26 and 30 December 2025, Saudi Arabia reacted forcefully to the STC’s advances in areas under its influence, carrying out airstrikes that first hit a separatist military camp and then the port of Mukalla, which is controlled by the Emirates. The aim was to strike two cargo ships that had departed from the UAE and were allegedly carrying weapons for the STC.
Abu Dhabi kept a low profile on that occasion, withdrawing—at Riyadh’s urging—its troops stationed in the area and declaring its support for regional stability and for Saudi Arabia itself. Nevertheless, serious friction between the two leading Gulf powers has existed since the war against the Houthis, when at certain stages the Emirates supported the STC—even militarily—against the very coalition of which they were a part. The same rivalry is also playing out in Sudan, where the two countries back opposing sides: Riyadh supports the Sudanese regular army, while the Emirates back the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The STC’s aim is to redraw an independent South Yemen, corresponding to what until 1990 was the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. This objective is far from guaranteed, however, because the Hadramout region—long marked by its own autonomist sentiments rooted in Yemen’s history—has shown resistance to such a project.
The United Arab Emirates’ ambition in backing the STC is to gain control over the stretch of territory running from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden’s outlet onto the Indian Ocean, including the resource-rich region of Hadramout, home to major gas and oil fields. Fully realizing this ambition would still have to contend with Hadrami resistance and with Saudi Arabia’s firm determination to retain control over eastern Yemen, so as not to emerge empty-handed after nearly a decade of war. Saudi Arabia, which has no intention of resuming the war against the Houthis, would otherwise lose regions of its traditional influence and be forced to abandon its hoped-for oil outlets along the coast of al-Mahra.
If the STC’s bid were to succeed, Yemen would revert to the binary structure it knew in the past, but this would generate tensions with Saudi Arabia and between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Alternatively, a form of coexistence could emerge between the South and what remains of the internationally recognized state, now led by a Presidential Council backed by Riyadh. That body is chaired by the unionist Rashad al-Alimi, with the separatist—and STC leader—Aidarous al-Zubeidi serving as vice president.
This arrangement is fraught with the potential for conflict, but it could also open the door to negotiated solutions: for example, a unified Yemen within the anti-Houthi camp but with strong autonomy for the South, or a tripartite formula of the kind outlined above.
Amid the complexity of the crises sweeping the Middle East, it is not easy to isolate one segment over another. Yet if the goal is to avoid even more serious and devastating conflagrations, it is necessary to think in terms of a broader strategy for regional stabilization, and to revive key diplomatic tracks that were launched in the past but have since been derailed by the current wave of crises: the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, the development of the Abraham Accords, and the consolidation of normalization between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Together, these processes could provide a significant boost to stability across the region—and, by extension, to Yemen and its surrounding maritime space.
These issues have long been under discussion but were interrupted by conflicts and tensions in which neither China nor Russia is blameless, as well as by ill-considered U.S. decisions. They remain on hold, shaped by recent events, by the policies the United States will pursue in the near future, and by the inevitable political shifts ahead in Israel. Yet they have not been entirely abandoned and remain, potentially, open to being taken up again.
From this perspective, the United States’ stance could prove decisive on the issue of Yemeni separatism as well. Washington recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for Rabat’s adherence to the Abraham Accords, and has so far taken note of al-Zubeidi’s statement that an independent South Yemen would adopt the same position. If this were to receive more formal confirmation, and if it were viewed favorably by the U.S. government, it could open the door to scenarios in which Washington lends support to the separatist cause.
Mario Boffo served as Italy’s Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen (2005–2010) and to Saudi Arabia (2013–2016).
Cover photo: Saudi-backed forces deployed in the city of Mukalla in Yemen’s coastal southern Hadramawt province. At least 80 troops from Yemen’s secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) have been killed in fighting with Saudi-backed forces and strikes since January 2, a military official from the group told AFP on January 4. (Photo by AFP)
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