The 27 October Israeli election is widely seen as a verdict on October 7th, 2023, a date that profoundly reshaped the country’s identity and outlook. But what kind of verdict will it be?
Israel is caught in a paradoxical solipsism. There has been no soul-searching over the 70,000 to 80,000 dead in Gaza, nor over the debate that documentaries such as Naza (2026) and The Voice of Hind Rajab (2025) have sparked abroad. Instead, there is a broad consensus that Israel must emerge from the war with more secure borders, which in practice means that its presence in 70 percent of the Strip is there to stay.
The Gaza War and Its Aftermath
The Israeli electorate carries a double trauma over Gaza that is almost impossible to grasp from abroad. Several governing parties, and some in the opposition as well (Yisrael Beiteinu, for example), believe that October 7 would never have happened without the 2005 unilateral disengagement plan launched by then-prime minister Ariel Sharon. Sharon is also remembered for the Sabra and Shatila massacre, yet in Israel today he is regarded as something of a “dove.” On Gaza, there is little discernible difference between parties considered “centrist,” such as Yesh Atid (even before its merger with Naftali Bennett) and Yashar, and the radical extremism of Otzma Yehudit, although the former stops short of openly calling for “remigration.”
What is genuinely new compared with the pre-2023 period, however, is that the centrist parties now agree on two points. First, Israel should not give up any of the territory it has won at the cost of war. Second, the military advantage it has gained on the ground should allow it to surround itself with buffer zones that guarantee its security, and to restore maximum deterrence against its enemies: Hamas and the fragmented but still extant “Axis of Resistance.” They also agree that the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is in no position to take on any governing responsibility.
Admittedly, the more radical parties, such as Religious Zionism (HaTzionut HaDatit) and Otzma Yehudit, openly talk of a “return to Gush Katif,” meaning the re-establishment of settlements in Gaza. The center-right, meanwhile, leans towards closer alignment with whatever the Board of Peace eventually decides, though it would still like to expel states it considers hostile, such as Qatar and Turkey, and, some say, Egypt as well. Finally, the “moderate” forces (HaDemokratim, Yashar and Beyachad) speak of a return to diplomacy. What they have in mind, though, is less a revival of dialogue with the Palestinians, who have vanished from the scene entirely, than a relaunch of regional cooperation with the moderate Gulf states and the United States.
The Two-State Solution
It is no surprise, then, that in a rare televised debate among party leaders, hosted by JNS on Sunday 11 October, eight of the nine leading parties (out of the 38 running) firmly opposed the creation of a Palestinian state. These positions match the latest Pew Research Center polling, which shows that most Jewish Israelis no longer believe in peace: only 16 percent support a Palestinian state, the lowest figure in thirty years. The disillusionment runs just as deep on the Palestinian side, where only one in five (21 percent) believe that Israel and a Palestinian state can coexist peacefully. Majorities on both sides, 56 percent in Israel and 68 percent in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, no longer consider a two-state solution possible, and it is unclear whether the Palestinian Authority will survive the next Israeli government.
It is clear that the post–October 7 context is very different from what came before. This is not because the Oslo Accords were not already in steep decline, but because “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” helped sweep away what remained of their superstructure. The architecture that emerges from the coming Israeli election will be substantially different. The question will no longer be what kind of relations to build with the Palestinian Authority, but what stance to take towards Israel’s Western allies and the Board of Peace. The current government has so far boycotted the Board, but some of the more moderate opposition forces (Yashar, Beyachad and HaDemokratim) would like to work with it to revive the special relationship with the United States, especially ahead of the midterms, which could see the Democrats regain control of Congress.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict as we knew it in the Twentieth Century, as a struggle between two national communities with an equal right to assert themselves on the same land, is over. It ended because the United Nations and the international community as a whole allowed the horror of Gaza to unfold without intervening. This lack of international pressure has had a direct effect on the Israeli election: the issue has dropped off the political agenda altogether, giving way to a series of other tensions that are polarizing the domestic debate.
The Ultra-Orthodox Question
First on the list are intra-Jewish conflicts. The war has made it clear to almost every opposition party that conscripting the ultra-Orthodox can no longer be put off, and neither can a fairer distribution of the tax burden. The issue has become even more pressing with the failure of what the IDF calls “the konseptzia” (the Concept): the military doctrine holding that Israel could gradually do without large numbers of soldiers by relying on technological superiority, cyber dominance and artificial intelligence to carry out 80 percent of routine monitoring tasks.
Since 2023, the war effort has intensified sharply and shows no sign of easing. It is now extending into a regional contest not only with the Axis of Resistance but also with Syria and Turkey, and every political force now shares the conviction that Israel is condemned to “live by the sword.” Against this backdrop, the IDF estimates that it is short 15,000 soldiers, at least 8,000 of them combat troops, and these can only realistically be recruited from among the ultra-Orthodox. According to several plausible demographic scenarios (see the work of Sergio Della Pergola), the ultra-Orthodox are projected to make up 35 percent of the Jewish population and half of the younger generation by 2065. Yet they remain a community that depends entirely on the rest of the country, both militarily and economically.
The significant growth in their demographic weight within the Jewish community therefore worries the secular opposition parties on several fronts. Yashar, Beyachad, Yisrael Beiteinu and HaDemokratim each propose different ways of dealing with it. The left (HaDemokratim), Beyachad and the party of Russian-origin Israelis (Yisrael Beiteinu) openly talk of confrontation, imposing compulsory conscription with penalties up to and including prison for draft evaders. Yashar, which wants to establish itself as the leading opposition force able to unite Israelis, stands firm on universal conscription but takes a more conciliatory tone. It proposes bringing the ultra-Orthodox into military service gradually through dedicated programs, civilian national service, and other incentives.
The opposition parties also see the ultra-Orthodox question through a wider lens. The issue is also the community’s failure to contribute to society as a whole. This shows up first in the tax exemptions and benefits the ultra-Orthodox enjoy: funding for yeshivas and kollels so that Haredi students can study full-time, subsidies for childcare and rent, steep discounts on municipal property tax (arnona), and above all, child allowances for their large families. It also shows up in their separate education system, which does not prepare young people for an active role in society because it fails to teach core subjects such as math and English. Netanyahu’s Likud, by contrast, regards the two ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ), as long-standing allies. It treats conscription as a secondary problem that can be managed through progressive quotas, bringing the Haredim into the army gradually and without friction.
Judicial Reform
The second hotly debated issue is the reform of the Supreme Court, or the well-known “override clause.” The opposition parties broadly defend the Supreme Court’s independence and the rule of law based on the separation of powers. There are some notable exceptions, however. Yisrael Beiteinu does not share this position, and Yashar has its own reservations: it opposes the government’s reform but would like to shift the balance between the judiciary and the legislature in the latter’s favor.
The governing coalition parties, by contrast, present the fight against the Supreme Court in epic terms. One of the slogans rallied around in support of the Levin reform, first pushed in 2023 and the target of widespread protest, is that the legal system should abandon its liberal origins and better reflect the sentiment and distinctiveness of the Jewish people: “If the Land of Israel is a land of holiness and values, then the legal system operating within it must also reflect its values and heritage.” In this way, the governing parties see themselves as waging a battle against a judicial elite they brand as “liberal” and accuse of making strategic decisions, such as on the right of Israel’s Arab citizens to family reunification, without having been elected. For the right-wing government, the Court’s ultimate sin is that its rulings allegedly endanger the lives of Israeli soldiers by restricting the IDF’s freedom to maneuver and fight. Against these rulings, and in the name of a kind of legal ethno-populism, a larger majority than in 2023 has reportedly come together, with supporters even among the opposition parties.
A Commission of Inquiry into 7 October
A third issue is the call for a commission of inquiry into who was responsible for the security failures of October 7th, 2023. The opposition parties want this to be a state commission of inquiry, appointed by the Supreme Court, while the governing parties want it appointed by the government. The bill Likud introduced in December 2025 proposes a “national-state commission of inquiry,” which would in effect hand the investigation to the Knesset. On this point, the opposition is united: it makes no sense, they argue, to entrust the inquiry to the very political forces responsible for the disaster, forces that contributed to “the worst catastrophe in Jewish history since the Holocaust.”
Economic Issues
The cost of living is also among the hot-button issues of the campaign. Many right-wing parties have made it a centerpiece of their platforms and are using it as an argument against Likud. They argue that liberalizing services and breaking up monopolies, especially in the agricultural sector, are essential reforms to give Israelis back a real choice and to keep costs down. The three agro-giants Tnuva, Tara, and Strauss control 85 percent of the market and set prices 50 percent higher than in European Union countries. These parties also argue that Netanyahu’s party has betrayed its original free-market vocation and slid into an economic populism that is harming the country.
The Scenarios
What sets this election apart is that Israeli public opinion is largely united on the major questions of foreign policy and security, but deeply divided in terms of political representation. Each of the 38 parties running represents a slice of the electorate whose positions depend on its “tribe” (to use former President Rivlin’s well-known term) or on the social group it belongs to: religious nationalists, settlers, the ultra-Orthodox, secular Israelis, Arab citizens. These parties nonetheless cluster into three main blocs: the pro-Bibi, pro-government camp; the “legitimate” opposition (the Zionist parties); and the “illegitimate” opposition (the Arab parties, which all the Jewish parties refuse to work with).
Polls point to a complex deadlock. Some small parties, such as the ultranationalist Amcha Israel and the Reservists’ Party (HaMiluimnikim), are hovering around the 3.25 percent electoral threshold and could tip the balance if they make it into the Knesset. The outcome will hinge not so much on which party wins the most seats as on which one best manages to unite its camp and bring smaller parties into its coalition. Many creative alliances could therefore emerge.
The first scenario is that the centrist Yashar comes first and Gadi Eisenkot is tasked with forming a government. He could build a coalition with the opposition parties plus the small Reservists’ Party, if it gets into the Knesset, and possibly with Shas, the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox party. Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, Shas’s spiritual leader, has signaled that he is open to backing the first Mizrahi prime minister in Israel’s history. This option, however, would mean watering down the proposed universal conscription reform. Alternatively, to stay consistent on conscription, Eisenkot might instead accept outside support from Ra’am, the small Islamist Arab party, once the votes are counted, and form a minority government.
The second scenario is that Likud stays in power with the parties that currently support it, plus two smaller right-wing parties, Amcha Israel and HaMiluimnikim. That would require both of them to clear the electoral threshold, as current polls suggest they might, and Likud to do better than expected. This would be the best-case scenario for Netanyahu and would mean broad continuity with the current far-right government. It would, however, create some challenges for the special relationship with the United States if the Democrats return to power.
The third scenario is that neither bloc reaches the 61 seats needed to govern. Since both have ruled out the Arab parties completely, they would then join forces in a national unity government, together with some smaller parties, including Beyachad and perhaps even Yisrael Beiteinu. The central problem in this case is that Netanyahu could not stay on as prime minister. Eisenkot would contest the post, and he would never agree to join a government as a junior partner, repeating Benny Gantz’s mistake. The paradox is that after a campaign built entirely around opposition to Bibi, the Zionist parties would come together on the big security issues, on which their views are very similar, while giving up on a commission of inquiry into October 7.
Netanyahu’s Staying Power
In any case, the extraordinary resilience of Netanyahu’s Likud, despite the debacle of October 7, is already a striking fact that has to be reckoned with. Well over a third of Israelis do not seem to regard any of the following as failures serious enough to bring down the government: responsibility for October 7; the money funneled to Hamas via Qatar; the redeployment of most army divisions to the West Bank; the dismissal of warnings from the United Arab Emirates and Egypt; the discrimination against and vilification of Israel’s Arab minority, together with the attempt to delegitimize its political representation; and, not least, the genocide in Gaza.
Weighing heavily on the scales in Bibi’s favor are the partial decapitation of the Iranian regime, the military (if not political) destruction of Hamas, the temporary defeat of Hezbollah, and the de facto creation of a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Just as important is the conviction that Israel is a safer place after October 7, and that its military comeback has allowed the country to recover a sense of unity and shared destiny. This finds expression above all in Jewish identity, in military superiority over its enemies, in the defeat of “Palestinianism” (to borrow Einat Wilf’s term), or of the myth of an independent Palestinian state, and in the dream of completing the “return” by building a Greater Israel.
Cover photo: Election billboards for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party and are pictured in Bnei Barak near Tel Aviv on October 18, 2026. (Photo by Ilia YEFIMOVICH / AFP)
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