While international attention is focused on the war with Iran—due to its implications for the global energy market and the threat of a potentially devastating escalation—fighting between Pakistan and Afghanistan has resumed with unprecedented intensity in the adjacent region.
Such a clash would have been unthinkable when the Taliban returned to power on August 15, 2021, reestablishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, in part thanks to Islamabad’s support. Pakistan, which had fostered the rise of the Taliban movement at the end of the last century, had regularly hosted Taliban leaders and militants engaged in a twenty-year struggle against the Afghan republican government backed by a US-led international coalition.
After more than three weeks of open war, and in the aftermath of the fragile Eid al-Fitr “pause” granted by Pakistan, the Emirate—despite its efforts to be readmitted to the international arena—finds itself once again isolated and vulnerable.
Since August 2021, the Afghan government’s ability to establish pragmatic relations with its neighbors—by expanding trade, granting mining permits, and committing to relaunching long-delayed major connectivity projects—has led to a gradual normalization of relations with regional players. The Emirate, formally recognized only by Russia, has nevertheless acquired some legitimacy akin to de facto recognition from neighboring countries. The United Nations has also committed to advancing the Doha Process aimed at Afghanistan’s gradual reintegration into the international system, albeit conditional on compliance with international obligations, including women’s rights and inclusive governance.
Now, however, the scenario has changed. Despite repeated assurances that no threats emanate from Afghanistan, neighboring countries are increasingly concerned about mounting security risks stemming from the presumed presence in Afghanistan of armed extremist groups—aligned with or tolerated by the Taliban—that pose a significant threat to regional and global security. In addition to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the only group against which the Emirate has so far acted effectively to weaken its operational capacity, al-Qaeda—historically linked to the Taliban—continues to operate from Afghanistan. Other groups include the Balochistan Liberation Army, which aspires to Balochistani independence (a territory shared by Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan), the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which opposes Beijing’s repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, as well as Uzbek and Tajik fundamentalist groups.
Among these armed groups, the primary threat to Pakistan is the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP or Pakistani Taliban), whose aim is to push the Pakistani government out of Khyber Pakhtunkwa province. It allegedly operates from Afghan territory and has intensified attacks against Pakistani targets (and Chinese targets in Pakistani territory) since the reestablishment of the Emirate. The failure of diplomatic pressure on Kabul to contain the TTP has prompted Islamabad to respond by forcibly repatriating hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees, periodically closing border crossings, and bombing TTP camps in Afghanistan. These attacks have resulted in numerous civilian casualties. Since February 26, the clashes have escalated into open warfare, with mutual recriminations and accusations.
However, the Emirate is reluctant to confront the TTP, fearing that coercive action against a movement with which it shares history, ideology, and ethnicity could push militants toward the Islamic State Khorasan Province. Kabul has responded to Islamabad’s complaints by claiming that TTP attacks are an internal Pakistani issue—paradoxically echoing the same argument Islamabad had used before August 2021 to reject accusations from the United States and the former Republic of Afghanistan of sheltering Taliban leaders on Pakistani soil.
Further exacerbating the conflict are the Emirate’s efforts to expand relations with India, as well as the unresolved dispute over the Durand Line—never recognized by Kabul as the official border with Pakistan—which divides the large area inhabited by the Pashtun ethnic group, to which almost all the Taliban belong.
Iran is also threatened by Baloch separatists operating from Afghanistan and, since the twelve-day war with Israel in June 2025, has intensified the repatriation of Afghan refugees, accusing them of collusion with the enemy. The ongoing war is leading to a new wave of forced repatriations to Afghanistan.
More than 25 years on, the current Emirate faces similar accusations to those leveled against the first Emirate: harboring and protecting armed groups intent on threatening other countries and, over the past four years, exploiting the security lever to gain regional advantages and legitimacy.
Unsurprisingly, Islamabad has declined China’s offer of mediation, stating that it has no intention of negotiating and instead relying on its clear military superiority, despite its adversary’s long experience in guerrilla warfare. After the initial rhetoric, the Taliban leadership now appears to be seeking de-escalation—to the point that the Emir carefully avoided mentioning the war with Pakistan in his Eid al-Fitr message.
On the conflict, China and the United States have so far expressed similar positions, declaring Pakistan’s military action against terrorism justified—a worrying development for the Emirate, which China had previously avoided criticizing directly. The United States has also accused the Emirate of using “hostage diplomacy,” following Iran’s example, by detaining American citizens (and other foreigners) in the hope of obtaining political concessions.
Furthermore, under U.S. pressure, the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), which had been due to be renewed for one year, was granted only a technical three-month extension by the UN Security Council on March 16, pending a broader reassessment.
Against this backdrop, the Emirate risks being equated with Iran as a hub of international terrorism, highlighting possible similarities in the motivations and outcomes of the two ongoing wars in the region. So far, Pakistan has avoided targeting Taliban power centers in its repeated attacks: a power vacuum in Afghanistan, where no organized movement is capable of replacing the current regime, would risk reintroducing civil war scenarios—similar to those that preceded the first Taliban regime—and spreading instability across the region.
For Pakistan and other regional actors, including Iran, such a prospect would be worse than the difficulties they already face in dealing with a problematic and opaque neighbor like Taliban-led Afghanistan. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the Emirate is experiencing its weakest moment since its reconstitution in August 2021.
Vittorio Sandalli served as Italy’s Ambassador to Afghanistan (2020–2022), Indonesia (2015–2020), and Georgia (2007-2011). He was previously Consul General in Johannesburg (2003–2007).
Cover photo: A Taliban security personnel walks past rubble at the site of an overnight Pakistan airstrike, at a residential area in Pol-e-Charkhi on the outskirts of Kabul on March 13, 2026. (Photo by Wakil KOHSAR / AFP)
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