Over the past decade, Turkey has tried to carve out a role as a regional power, swinging between neo-Ottoman ambition and economic pragmatism. Ankara has multiplied its interventions: backing Qatar, confronting the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, and deepening its involvement in Libya. Yet since October 7, 2023, the balance of power in the Middle East has shifted again. The Gaza war, the reshuffling of alliances, and the weakening of the so-called “axis of resistance” have all curbed Ankara’s claims to leadership, according to Cengiz Aktar, Turkish dissident and professor of Political Science at the University of Athens, in an interview with Reset DOC.
Since October 7th, 2023, the Middle East has entered a new phase of instability. From a Turkish perspective, how would you describe the main geopolitical shifts that have taken place over the past two years?
We are witnessing a profound shift in the regional balance of power, marked by the absolute hegemony of Israel—backed not only by the United States, but also by the major Western European powers. This is new: Israel now has carte blanche, a free hand in the region. It is systematically supported by Western governments to an extent never seen before. And it is led by a fascist government, supported by the majority of the Israeli population. This is a major development, with vast and lasting consequences for Israel itself, for the region, and for the Western world.
How has the role of Turkey changed?
Two years ago, Turkey was already not a powerful country, and the latest events in Gaza and across the region have weakened it even further. The bombastic declarations coming from Ankara are one thing; the reality is another. Turkey is no match for Israel. It has limited military and financial capabilities and does not represent a real threat to Israel in the region. That may have been different in the past, but certainly not anymore.
At the same time, Turkey has remained pragmatic and realistic, eager to maintain trade relations with virtually everyone. So, while the regime has adopted a harsh anti-Israel and even anti-Jewish rhetoric, it has continued to trade with Tel Aviv at an unprecedented level. Turkey is now among Israel’s top five trading partners, exporting all sorts of non-lethal, non-military materials.
How do you interpret this stance?
Recently, Turkey acquired a specialized division within the Italian company Piaggio in the aerospace sector, which has long collaborated with Israel. Through this acquisition by Baykar—the defense company owned by President Erdoğan’s son-in-law—Ankara has also developed a working relationship with Leonardo, a major Italian defense company. Baykar and Leonardo have even created a joint venture, LBA Systems, split 50–50. Leonardo itself is mentioned in the UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese’s report “From economy of occupation to economy of genocide.”
The Turks are clearly not shy about doing business, including arms’ export, with Israel. Yet, at the same time, the Turkish government maintains an extremely harsh rhetoric—openly supportive of Hamas and even hosting Hamas leaders in Ankara and Istanbul. It’s the height of hypocrisy, a form of political schizophrenia.
How does Turkish public opinion view the Erdoğan government’s position, considering that there have been no large demonstrations for Gaza in Turkey — especially when compared to those we’ve seen across Europe?
Public opinion in Turkey is overwhelmingly against Israel, but people cannot express it openly—and they’re deeply frustrated. For the government, any street demonstration is seen as risky and potentially dangerous, and the police intervene immediately. Public expressions of solidarity with Gazans or the Palestinian people are strictly forbidden. Yet opinion polls leave no doubt: more than 90 percent of Turks support Palestine.
On one hand, there is Israel’s new regional assertiveness; on the other, the weakening of what is often called the “axis of resistance” — or the “axis of evil,” depending on one’s perspective. Could this shift open new opportunities for Turkey in the region, perhaps even in terms of new alliances?
That’s highly unlikely. Turkey simply lacks the means to match its ambitions. The real players in the region today are the Arab countries: the United Arab Emirates, which is very close to Israel; Qatar; Saudi Arabia, which plays a key role, especially in its dialogue with Washington; and Egypt.
There are also major question marks about Israel’s long-term influence and assertiveness in the region, particularly toward Syria and Lebanon. It will be extremely difficult for any Israeli government—this one or the next—to “run” the region. Israel will certainly try to exert influence and maintain control where it can, but can the region’s future really rest on military might alone? That’s the real question. In the long run, military dominance is not sustainable—it always backfires sooner or later.
One important development over the past two years for Turkey has been the announcement of the PKK’s dissolution and the end of its armed struggle. How would you describe the situation today and its effects on the area?
The PKK has not been active in Turkey for years. Its strongholds in the Kandil Mountains of northeastern Iraq were heavily targeted, and its focus has shifted instead to Rojava, or Syrian Kurdistan. A year ago, Erdoğan’s ally, the head of the Nationalist Action Party, Devlet Bahçeli, launched a new initiative called “A Turkey Without Terror,” but nothing concrete has followed—no reforms, no political change.
The Kurdish movement led by Abdullah Öcalan has effectively been co-opted by the regime, and even its most basic demands—such as recognizing Kurdish as an official language—remain ignored. As a result, the Kurdish movement inside Turkey is in deep crisis. Many observers predict that in the next elections it may not even enter parliament, given the widespread disillusionment among Kurdish voters.
And in Syria?
At the same time, under pressure from the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia—and in light of the military realities on the ground—Ankara has been forced to accept the existence of the autonomous region in northeastern Syria, led by Kurdish forces. Although Kurds form only a minority there—around three million people out of circa 25 million— they are leading the administration together with Arabs, Armenians, Syriacs, and Turkmens. This reality is now irreversible.
The center of gravity of the Kurdish question—across Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey—has shifted to Rojava. The Kurdish-led forces there, numbering around 120,000 well-equipped, well-trained and combat-proven soldiers — they have clearly crushed ISIS in Syria —, are likely to become Syria’s official army in the near future. Turkey lacks the means to oppose this and has had to accept it. While the PKK’s disarmament has brought no tangible gains for Kurds inside Turkey, it has clearly consolidated their position in Syria.
So, Turkey won’t try to take advantage of the Syrian regime change?
Ankara keeps insisting that it wants to help create a new Syrian army. But there already is one—there’s no need for a second. As long as the Americans, the French, and the British remain involved, it will be extremely difficult to alter the balance of power. The special U.S. representative for Syria—who also serves as the American ambassador in Ankara—is Tom Barrack. A real estate magnate close to Trump and of Lebanese origin, he knows the region well and understands its key players.
Just a few days ago, Mazloum Abdi, the Kurdish commander-in-chief of the military forces of the Autonomous Administration of Northeastern Syria, flew by U.S. Chinook helicopter to meet Ahmad Shara, the self-appointed prime minister in Damascus. The two had already met in March, and their dialogue is ongoing under the auspices of the Americans, the French, and the British. Turkey is not part of this picture.
Turkey’s influence in the Middle East seems to have diminished. Is this because President Erdoğan is now more focused on domestic politics than on foreign affairs?
Not really. The current regime remains eager to play an active role in the region. That’s how its foreign interventions began in the first place. Before 2011, since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey had never been involved in the affairs of its southern or eastern neighbors. It was always a country oriented toward the West. This regional activism is, in fact, a new phenomenon for Turkey. Today, the government harbors ambitions across the wider region—not only in the Mashreq but also in the Maghreb. Libya, for instance, is particularly significant, given its shared history with both Turkey and Italy. The Turkey–Libya–Italy triangle deserves close attention: while Ankara has limited influence in its immediate neighborhood, it has become an important player in Libya.
Beyond that, Turkey sells its drones to anyone willing to buy affordable equipment. But you don’t become a world power that way. To develop genuine capabilities, you need advanced technology—hence the importance of acquiring Piaggio and, so to speak, sitting at the same table as Leonardo. Turkey still lacks the high-tech capacity to advance its military production.
Cover photo: Senior Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militant, Sabri Ok (C), speaks to journalists during a ceremony in the Qandil area of northern Iraq, where the militant group announced its complete withdrawal of forces from Turkey, on October 26, 2025. (Photo by Shwan MOHAMMED / AFP)
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