Two years after the events of October 7, 2023, the Middle East is undergoing a profound phase of redefinition. The conflict between Israel and Hamas, rising tensions with Iran, and intensifying global competition have prompted the Gulf countries to reassess their strategic priorities. In this context, the perspective of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) revolves around two central axes: the protection of their domestic transformation programs—the so-called Visions—and the safeguarding of security within an increasingly multipolar environment.
Defending the Visions Means Defending the Monarchies’ Transition
The Gulf leaderships view the Vision programs—Vision 2030 in Saudi Arabia, Vision 2040 in Oman, Vision 2050 in the United Arab Emirates, and so on—as the key to securing their countries’ political and social future. These plans represent far more than economic strategies: they are instruments of legitimacy and internal stability, mechanisms designed to guide the transition from traditional monarchies to modernizing ones—capable of fostering innovation and social change without undermining institutional continuity.
In this sense, defending the Vision frameworks has become the Gulf states’ foremost geopolitical priority today.
Every regional crisis—from the Red Sea to the Gaza Strip—is interpreted also in terms of the risks it poses to the continuity of Gulf investment programs, the flow of foreign capital, and the image of global hubs that these leaders are striving to build.
Defending the Vision programs thus means defending the transition itself: a delicate balance between economic openness and political preservation, between social modernization and institutional control.
Doha as a Watershed: Diversifying Security Partnerships
The second key factor concerns security. Recent developments in Doha—where cooperation between the United States and Qatar has deepened on both military and intelligence fronts—have strengthened Doha’s role as Washington’s preferred interlocutor in the short term.
However, for other Gulf states, this has served as a strategic warning: reliance on a single security ally can prove risky. Hence, the accelerated push to diversify defense and military technology partnerships.
Saudi Arabia, for instance, has recently signed an agreement with Pakistan on civil nuclear cooperation—a clear signal of its openness to new horizons. The United Arab Emirates, meanwhile, is multiplying channels of dialogue with powers such as China and India, including on issues related to security and cyber defense.
At the same time, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is preparing for a new visit to the United States, confirming a strategy that does not seek to replace but rather to rebalance security relationships within a framework of pragmatic multipolarism.
In short, the Gulf is striving to move from a system of guaranteed protection to one of shared and adaptive security—in which the United States remains the main, but not the only, partner.
Israel as a Divisive and Perceptual Factor in Gulf Security
Two years after October 7, the Gulf states’ position toward Israel has become more complex and cautious. For the United Arab Emirates, the red line remains clear: any annexation of West Bank territory would force Abu Dhabi to reconsider—if not suspend—the Abraham Accords.
The UAE has invested significant political and reputational capital in its diplomatic opening toward Israel, but it is not prepared to sacrifice its regional credibility in the process.
For Saudi Arabia, by contrast, the prospect of normalization now appears distant. After two years of war in Gaza, Saudi public opinion is demanding a concrete gesture—even a symbolic recognition of Palestine—before any move toward official relations with Israel.
Riyadh’s leadership is well aware that disregarding this popular sentiment would jeopardize the internal legitimacy essential to sustaining Vision 2030.
Qatar—and, more broadly, several other GCC countries—now perceive Israel as the main threat to regional stability, particularly after the Israeli attacks on Iran and on Doha. This perception is reflected not only in their security policies but also in their growing diplomatic caution.
The Gulf states find themselves having to balance their desire for stability with the need to remain consistent in their support for the Palestinian cause—which remains deeply rooted in Arab public opinion.
Toward a Collective Gulf Security: A New Opportunity for Europe
There is also a growing awareness among the Arab Gulf states that strengthening the internal cohesion of the GCC has become a strategic imperative. The events of the past two years—from the return of instability in the Red Sea to the risk of escalation between Iran and Israel—have prompted the Gulf monarchies to discuss, with greater seriousness, forms of joint deterrence and closer defensive cooperation.
The goal is not to create an “Arab NATO,” but rather to consolidate a regional deterrence capability that reduces collective vulnerability and enhances the Gulf’s bargaining power on the international stage.
In this direction, the GCC’s effort is currently at its peak: a year ago, it approved the GCC Vision for Regional Security—a common framework aimed at integrating member states’ security policies, strengthening cooperation in cyber, maritime, and technological domains, and promoting a shared approach to managing regional crises.
Within this framework, the European Union can play a crucial role. Europe is perceived as a non-confrontational security actor—one capable of offering technological and industrial partnerships in the defense sector without creating friction with Washington.
From maritime missions such as Aspides in the Red Sea to cooperation on cybersecurity and the protection of critical infrastructure, the EU can help build a shared security architecture with the Gulf—one based not only on deterrence, but also on resilience.
Cover photo: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C) meets with foreign ministers of Gulf Cooperation Council nations on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City on September 24, 2025. (Photo by Stefan Jeremiah / POOL / AFP)
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