Updated on September 11, 2025: After Prime Minister François Bayrou and his minority government lost a key confidence vote in the National Assembly on Monday, President Emmanuel Macron appointed close ally Sébastien Lecornu as France’s new prime minister.
A historian and political scientist, emeritus professor at Sciences Po, and holder of the BNP-BNL-Paribas Chair in “Italian-French Relations for Europe” at LUISS, Marc Lazar is one of the foremost observers of French and European politics. In his latest book, Pour l’amour du peuple. Histoire du populisme en France, XIXe–XXIe siècle (2025), he traces the roots of French populism. In Left. Crisis and Challenges of the European Left (End of the Twentieth Century–2020s) (2024), he examines the challenges facing the European left. Earlier, together with Ilvo Diamanti in Peuplecratie (2018), he described the rise of the “people” as a new central actor in politics. We meet him at a moment of deep political uncertainty, with France once again facing the prospect of institutional instability.
Professor Lazar, why is France, one of Europe’s strongest economies, now being called the continent’s new “sick man”? First it was Greece, then Italy under Silvio Berlusconi, then Germany… How is it possible that a financial measure could topple François Bayrou’s government?
In France, political distrust is extremely high, and it began well before Emmanuel Macron’s rise to the Élysée in 2017. In the preceding years, Sarkozy and Hollande had alternated in power, yet the French always felt that problems—especially social ones—remained unresolved. This was despite France having one of the most generous social protection systems in Europe. However, some restrictions on welfare were very poorly received.
Macron’s victory in 2017 came as a surprise: he ran as an outsider but ultimately disappointed. In fact, he provoked an unprecedented level of hostility. He is deeply disliked not only by the Rassemblement National and the radical right, but also by a segment of the right, which never accepted his victory, convinced that François Fillon should have won after five years of Socialist government. On the left, Macron was accused of “betraying” Hollande, for whom he had been Minister of the Economy, and he is opposed by La France Insoumise. Moreover, he is widely rejected by the working classes, who perceive him as arrogant and distant.
So, at its root, there is a deep political distrust…
This crisis of trust is intertwined with the social situation. In France, there is what Tocqueville called a “passion for equality”: a strong sensitivity to social, gender, territorial, and generational inequalities. This is particularly pronounced because the welfare system has historically been solid, even if it functions less effectively today. There is also a cultural and identity dimension. France is asking itself, “Who are we, the French?” Once a great power, it is now perceived as a medium-level power, which has generated widespread cultural unease. On top of this comes the issue of immigration. France has a long history of immigration dating back to the 19th century, but today diversity creates tensions because the traditional model of integration—freedom in private life and laïcité in public life—works far less effectively than in the past.
Returning to the economy: how did debt reach such a high level—114 percent of GDP—and a public deficit of 5.8 percent of GDP, to the point of forcing Bayrou to consider extreme and unpopular measures like the current financial plan, with cuts of 44 billion euros, as well as the elimination of certain public holidays?
There are two explanations. First, public spending has always remained high, partly due to an aging population. The left accuses Macron of favoring businesses with tax breaks and subsidies without achieving tangible results in terms of growth. Second, the pandemic. The measures adopted during COVID-19 involved exceptional spending, unparalleled in other countries, which drove the debt higher. Then there was the energy crisis, accompanied by state aid.
Today, France is paying very high interest rates. The situation is serious, though not comparable to Greece. The country is still supported by large multinationals, an administrative apparatus that remains efficient, world-class universities, and an economic vitality that should not be underestimated. Demographically, the birth rate remains one of the highest in the European Union, although it has declined over the past two years, reigniting the long-standing debate over “demographic decline.”
Demographic decline and immigration have fueled the rise of the radical right for decades. From Jean-Marie Le Pen to today, no one has been able to stop its ascent—not Sarkozy, not Hollande, nor Macron. But why?
Today, the Rassemblement National commands over 33 percent of the vote. This is a failure of French politics. Sarkozy tried to contain the far right by adopting its themes, especially on immigration, but the economic results of his five-year term were disappointing. Hollande had full powers but was a political and economic disaster. Macron had promised to drastically reduce RN support—and he, too, failed.
The French feel they have tried everything: the right, the left, the center, even the outsider Macron—without seeing any concrete improvements. Hence the idea: “Why not try the RN?” Their success rests on two pillars: immigration and identity. The left is divided—some advocate a tough stance on irregular immigration, while others maintain an internationalist and welcoming approach. The RN has been able to impose its own narrative: cutting benefits for immigrants is seen as a solution to the debt, even though the numbers say otherwise.
And the left? It has not managed to stop this drift either; in fact, it has reinforced the perception of a distant elite. Hollande, for example, was seen as technocratic and elitist with the Socialists. Macron even closed the ENA, the country’s quintessential elite school, yet it changed nothing.
The French left has practiced a “shameful” reformism, unable to openly admit it as such. During his campaign, Hollande declared, “My enemy is finance,” only to do nothing in that direction, disappointing voters. Today, the Socialist Party has fewer than 40,000 members and survives thanks to its network of municipalities. It has never conducted a political assessment of Hollande’s five-year term, admitted mistakes, or claimed successes.
As for Macron and the closure of the ENA, it was a demagogic decision, born in the wake of the Yellow Vest crisis. In reality, he simply recreated a similar institution. But the problem is broader: in France, distrust does not concern only politics—it extends to the entire elite. There is a widespread rejection of the ruling class, unprecedented in its scope. France needs to rebuild trust, to “create society,” as we say. In the past, despite the divisions between Communists and Gaullists, there was a common bond: France itself. Today, society appears fragmented politically, socially, and culturally.
The most recent legislative elections were in July 2024. What would happen in the event of early elections?
There are two possibilities. The first: Macron tries to change the electoral law by introducing a fully proportional system, as François Mitterrand did in 1986. Almost all parties would be in favor, except the Républicains. In that case, compromises would be inevitable. If the electoral law does not change, two scenarios arise: either the RN gains an absolute majority, or there will once again be no clear majority. In the second case, pressure from La France Insoumise and the RN to push Macron to resign would become immense, triggering a full-blown institutional crisis. The lesson from all this is that the institutions of the Fifth Republic, designed to ensure stability, no longer fulfill that role.
So the French deadlock is not only political and economic, but also institutional…
La France Insoumise has been calling for a Sixth Republic for years. I don’t know if that is the solution, but certainly the Fifth Republic has exhausted its driving force, to quote Berlinguer regarding the October Revolution. Renewal measures will be necessary. The second point to consider is the contradiction of the political parties. All forces claimed that the Fifth Republic needed to be corrected by increasing the power of Parliament. Since 2022, they have had the opportunity, but they have shown themselves incapable of inventing a form of parliamentary democracy with a strong executive elected by the people. Today, Macron has an almost Bonapartist, centralist conception: everything depends on the president. He was completely wrong about this.
The prospect of future RN victories is not so far-fetched. Will it become—or is it becoming—acceptable to Europe in the same way that Italy’s far-right party, Brothers of Italy, has been accepted or is in the process of being accepted?
I doubt it. In 2024, the RN achieved an impressive electoral expansion; it is now present across almost all social categories and no longer represents only the popular vote. In the event of new elections, if the RN were to secure an absolute majority along with a victory in a new presidential election, the Fifth Republic would face a dramatic period, with no comparison to the situation in Italy under Brothers of Italy.
Unlike Meloni, who is part of the conservative party in the European Parliament, the RN has a more radical orientation, closer to Orbán: pro-Russian, in favor of reducing France’s ties with Europe, and even inclined to leave NATO. In the event of a victory, France would face a severe economic and financial crisis, with heavy pressure from the markets, as well as an intense political crisis, with the risk of large protests and possible clashes. The impact would not be purely national: the consequences for Europe would be enormous.
Cover photo: France’s President Emmanuel Macron (R) shakes hand with France’s Prime Minister Francois Bayrou (C) upon his arrival for a farewell to arms ceremony for former chief of staff of France’s armed forces in the courtyard of the Hotel des Invalides in Paris on September 5, 2025. (Photo by Christophe Ena / POOL / AFP)
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