This study was conducted by the Arab European Media Observatory (Ibrahim Saleh and Oliver Hahn)
Media globalization is acutely aware of the role played by satellite TV in promoting and sustaining public diplomacy. However the degree of success achieved is rarely assessed in an objective and independent manner. Hence, posing this question is directly related to the relation between forms of communicative interaction on one hand, and on the other the contexts of such interaction as well as the varied differences among those participating. Viewers’ perceptions of transnational TV channels are closely related to the concept of "dialogue" using an interpretive process based on conjecture, criticism, and reconstruction of ideas, emphasising the function of vigorous debate and discussion as a basis for drawing defensible conclusions of opinions and speculations. However, there is a main obstacle faced by all transnational TV channels, which is the simple fact that relying on news media to understand distant places results a double misinterpretation, because distant audiences have a limited understanding of distant contexts and even journalists are not usually equipped to interpret events when they are far from the contextualization of such news.
Such a lack of understanding subconsciously directs journalists covering distant and unfamiliar places to choose contacts with whom they feel comfortable working, and usually as culturally close to them as possible, also people sharing the same world views. As a result, many foreign correspondents who spend time in the region, living in their ghettos and not engaged with the local culture, language and country, whether teaching courses at foreign institutes, or covering news stories, or fulfilling their military commitments to their agencies, claim in very arrogant ways to be experts, people who know everything, and in some cases even performing a civilizing mission. These transnational TV channels often aim to lead others to pre-formed conclusions; or as a set of ground rules and procedures for debating the merits of alternative views; or as a way to frustrate, and deconstruct conventional understandings. Hence, most of the time public diplomacy stipulates deeper assumptions about the nature of knowledge, the nature of inquiry, the nature of communication, and the mutual ethical obligations thereof.
The problem of the mechanism followed by these TV channels lies in the packaging of media discourses on the basis of central prototypical cases within a category, instead of acting one more equivocal in meaning, making the content more variable, more indeterminate, more likely to alter organizing, and more consequential for adapting. Hence, the irony here lies in this ignorance, superficial understanding and superiority complex that completely blocks the process of dialogue and understanding. Indeed, there are other knowledgeable and informed scholars and journalists who really did spend time, spoke the language and understood the culture, and whose objective it was to deal fairly with differences in a respectful way. It is thus very important to assess how audiences in the region perceive the Arabic TV services of International Satellite Broadcasters such as Deutsche Welle, France 24 and Russia Today in Egypt.
This article tries to answer a number of questions: "How to bypass the myth that "bigger is better" without considering the cultural contexts?" "How Arab audiences choose their own cultural preferences amidst the available myriad media offerings?" "How do they ensure that Arab viewers identify with them?", and "How successful is public diplomacy in cross-cultural dialogue?". In the cross-cultural study conducted by Saleh and Lehmann, the European Union was judged favourably by Egyptian students (58.2%), France scored even higher (62.1%), the UK (49%), Russia (43.9%) and the US (31.6%). Furthermore, only 25.7% of Egyptian students studying journalism and political science continuously follow the foreign media, while 29.9% of respondents rarely kept up with the news through the foreign media, and more than 46.3% never watched any foreign media channels for a variety of reasons (1).
When students were asked about the level of approval of European cultural, media and political intervention in the Arab world, there was a collective rejection regarded to any form of involvement. For example, there was strong disapproval (43.7%) of any form of intervention, while 52.2% disagreed in some way, leaving less than 4.1% accepting involvement in any form. In a question related to the possible reasons behind current misconceptions between the West and the Arab world, students linked reasons for the current level of misunderstanding to the de-contextualization of news prioritising the understanding of culture before the use of language. The primary obstacle was considered to be politics 87.7%, followed by cultural differences (55.6%), and finally religious differences with 55.1%.
While Egyptian students still believe that there is room for improvement, results confirm these findings with 54.1% agreeing strongly, and 24.5% favourable, achieve a total of 79.6%. Another pilot study conducted by Saleh and Hahn raised a number of questions. The main one was a question concerning the level of awareness of Arabic-speaking satellite channels owned by foreign countries (2). The study confirmed the tendency among graduate students to be more familiar with the three channels studied in the paper than undergraduate students. However the percentage in both cases is not significant. Graduate students numbered 55%, while among undergraduate students the percentage dropped to35%. However, when asked whether they actually followed and watched these channels, only one undergraduate student (5%) has actually seen El-Hurra, while the rest had never seen any of the three TV channels. The group of graduates provided different responses. Three students had watched France 24 (15%), two had watched DW (10%), five students had watched El-Hurra (25%), and one student had watched Sahara, the Iranian Channel (5%).
When students were asked how they perceived Arabic-speaking Satellite TV, there was a generally negative attitude towards these channels (51.7%), especially among undergraduate students (61.7%) who emphasized that these Arabic-speaking channels have forfeited their purpose. The undergraduate group had a collective negative view (95%) of these channels and described them as "Either nothing for most of the time", "Bias and Fake", "Shallow", "Bias and Credible", "What are they trying to do or achieve?", "Political Games", "Boring and Bias" with only one respondent (5%) saying that they played an important role. The group of graduates had more positive perception, although only marginally. Only three students (15%) said that these channels provide "Objective and Quality Reporting", "Intellectual Understanding", and were "Interesting". The remaining answers (85%) were very negative such as "Nothing", "Public Diplomacy and Propaganda", "Where is the Arab Voice in these channels?", "Trying to influence Arab audiences", "Stereotyping", Bias", and "Double Standards".
In answering the main question asking whether these Arab-Speaking channels and tools of Public Diplomacy have succeeded or not, the answer for the moment seems negative and depressing, as the result of the dichotomy between the operators of these channels on one hand, and on the other their target audiences, or the Arab public, who are either not aware of them or define them as "Falk Devils" (3). Most of these attempts have failed to sell the product and even further mitigated its more noxious effects! Even those who hitherto expressed total loyalty to the western world, either due to political or economic interests and affiliations, later had second thoughts. However, it is not too late to rescue public diplomacy, though this requires a fundamentally different approach. This new strategy must rely more on listening than on speaking, more on “second track” (4) rather than official diplomacy, and more on civic engagement than the actions of government representatives.
This advice to listen, rather than simply push a product, is central to salvaging the international reputation of the European countries. Most of the time, foreign Arabic-speaking channels fail "to win the hearts and minds" of the Arab public for three reasons: arrogance, impatience, and lack of listening from the communicators’ side. This arrogance is a result of a combination of the history of colonization and a polarized approach to things in the form of "My way, or no way." In being offended by such a characterization and then discounting it altogether, the news discourse of these channels only reinforces global perceptions. Besides, most of these channels lack REAL (Rating or Non-Rating Research) that follows a simple format of RACE (Research-Action-Communication-Evaluation). Another problem is the lack of insight in the contextualization of Arab society and the notorious desire for change to happen almost overnight, when there is a "need for orientation" that needs a carefully pre-planned media strategy to operate on a much slower timeline, making the whole process a waste of money.
The paradox is that the communicators running these channels refuse to listen to statistics or audience feedback. What the Arab viewers of these channels are more active listening for, are aspirations. Listening is a sign of respect reflecting that the communicator is actually interested in what the other person might have to say. Many of the non-Arabs communicators miss is the simple point that the limited number of viewers, who have access to satellite TV are very selective when making choices that are based on their historical memory concerning the country broadcasting the channels, current political relation with the foreign country, but most importantly the kind of discourse and how it is branded to fit the local audience in the region.
Finally, Foreign Offices must be humble enough to admit mistakes. This is not the rule, but exceptions are possible. Finally, cause and effect remain in the hands of the officers running these media services, because they neither admit their mistakes, nor seek reliable studies to evaluate their performance. Such situations can reach a point of dialogue among the deaf. As Alberto Fernandez, director of US press and public diplomacy for Near Eastern Affairs, told Al-Jazeera in October 2006: “We tried to do our best [in Iraq] but I think there is much room for criticism because, undoubtedly, there was arrogance and there was stupidity from the United States in Iraq.” In all cases, the Arab public remains very sceptical about these channels and is more likely to expect propaganda and spin rather than truth from TV channels like Deutsche Welle, France 24, or Russia Today, if they had any knowledge about them at the first place! In the end the answer would be that public diplomacy has failed, at least for now, to initiate or even maintain cross cultural dialogue through these TV channels.
Notes:
(1) Surveying a sample of (600) in a cross cultural study that was conducted by Ibrahim Saleh and Ingrid Lehmann. The study investigated the perception of "others" in six countries (600)in conjunction of partners in UAE, Egypt, US, Austria, Germany & Kuwait among the university students between the period of January and March 2007.
(2) Surveying a sample (100) of Egyptian students in (Rural & Urban) Egypt studying journalism & Mass Communication, and a pilot study of (40) Egyptian students studying journalism at the American University in Cairo; (20) of the sample is an undergraduate and the other (20) is a graduate. The study was conducted by Ibrahim Saleh & Oliver Hahn as part of the The Arab-European Media Observatory. Both methods use a purposive non-probability sample to fit the nature of the study.
(3) "Falk Devils" is a term that mass media use to create controversies (crusading journalism), however such pervasive campaigns of hostility through gossip and spin in media can be strong enough to influence a nation’s politics and legislation. Cohens, S. (2002). Folk Devils and Moral Panics. Third Edition, Routledge.
(4) "Second Track" it was a term by Davies & Kaufman developed the term to emphasize alternative dialogue to address conflict issues between unofficial representatives or equivalent opinion leaders from communities in conflict. Indeed, its role and function compliment the first track official diplomacy. Davies, J. & Kaufman, E. (2002). Second Track/Citizens’ Diplomacy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.