United by geography and a long history that, since the end of the Ottoman Empire and especially during the long rule of the Assads, has taken on the characteristics of colonialism and occupation in the name of a “Greater Syria,” Lebanese and Syrians today share the same hope: that tomorrow will be different from today, putting an end to conflicts and reducing them to “wars of the past.” Reality demands this. In 2018, Lebanon’s GDP exceeded 55 billion dollars; today, it barely reaches 20 billion. One hundred thousand Lebanese pounds, which were worth 65 dollars at that time, are now worth just one. In Syria, in 2011, when the brutal repression of anti-government protests began, GDP reached 45 billion dollars; today it is only 9 billion, while the country’s production, once known as “the breadbasket of the Middle East,” can no longer even meet national needs.
After nearly a century of fratricide, the reasons for fostering good neighborly relations, capable of ending imperialism and particularism, are becoming clear. A new mindset could make this possible, as the new Lebanese president, Joseph Aoun, has outlined: sovereignty and alignment with the “Arab concert.” However, today, the direction of Arab affairs seems to be shaped by the influential Gulf countries, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. This would mean acknowledging that these countries are the winners of the Arab conflict, which throughout the second half of the twentieth century saw the monarchies of the oil-rich nations (living off parasitic rents) clash with the republics ruled by coup leaders (who upheld state-directed economies).
This vision would not require a shift for Beirut, but it would for Damascus. Could a regime change in Syria—a U-turn—bring the country in line with this new direction? Such a change could end the Syrian-Lebanese conflict. But can Syria, now led by a former al-Qaeda and later ISIS militia member, Ahmed al-Sharaa, choose this path?
From Assad’s downfall to Syria’s return to the Arab stage
The new Syria was born just a few months ago, and al-Sharaa’s first steps have seemed consistent with the Assad regime’s policies, especially in terms of dirigisme and centralization. However, Syria, on its own, will not be able to succeed, and the true dominant player quickly emerged—not an Arab country, but Turkey. This is hardly the ideal context for envisioning alignment with the idea of an “Arab concert.”
The situation changed when U.S. President Donald Trump, during a visit to Saudi Arabia, announced, after a long discussion with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, his decision to lift the sanctions that had stifled any prospects for Syria’s economic recovery. The sanctions had been designed to weaken the Assad regime, which had been overthrown by al-Sharaa’s Islamist forces at the end of 2024. Trump, who also has strong ties with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, made it clear that Erdogan had played a role in pushing him toward this decision. Since then, relations between Damascus and key Arab capitals, especially Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, have steadily strengthened.
The Gulf’s influential Arab monarchies, which have long feared political Islam and the fundamentalism represented by figures like al-Sharaa, did not greet him with warmth. Yet, they supported Trump’s shift, hoping that the dire, emergency nature of the situation would push the new leader toward pragmatism. According to Nicholas Heras of the New Lines Institute in Washington, “the Emirati authorities view al-Sharaa and his allies as a dangerous example of a successful revolutionary Islamist militant movement in the Middle East. Al-Sharaa embodies everything the UAE has spent billions of dollars fighting against throughout the region.” Saudi Arabia under Mohammed bin Salman is not far off in its stance.
Syria is militarily dependent on Turkey, with which it shares a long and problematic border, but the support of powerful Arab neighbors is crucial for al-Sharaa. Despite the U.S. decision to lift sanctions— a process that will take time to fully implement—economic forecasts for the coming year predict growth of only 1 percent. Reconstruction, after 14 years of war-induced devastation, will require an expenditure of 400 billion dollars. Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain essential if there is any hope of envisioning a future for the new Syria.
Al-Sharaa: Between the Abraham Accords and Internal Fragility
During his conversation with al-Sharaa, after announcing the lifting of sanctions, Trump asked him to join the Abraham Accords—that is, to sign a peace treaty with Israel, thereby addressing the recent tensions between the two countries, especially following Israel’s forces crossing several kilometers into Syrian territory.
However, there is an ideological challenge in Trump’s proposal: it would require ending the Arab rejection of Israel, a stance held for decades. This position was only shifted when Arab nations, at different times, adopted the “peace for land” formula. So, what now?
The first concrete step was the initiation of direct negotiations between Israel and Turkey regarding the Syrian situation. Following that, the United Arab Emirates facilitated indirect—and some even suggest direct—talks between Syrians and Israelis. For al-Sharaa, the key issues, especially after his recent visit to Abu Dhabi, are twofold: the first concerns his jihadist base of support, and an agreement with Israel would signify a break from his origins. However, there is also a more specific Syrian issue: Damascus still officially claims sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which were occupied and later annexed by Israel. The return of the Golan was a cornerstone of national ideology during Assad’s rule.
Is al-Sharaa willing to make not just an “ideological” shift but also abandon the Golan? According to many international media outlets, the path Damascus appears to be considering is a return to the 1974 armistice with Israel, along with extensive new protocols. This would also involve an Israeli withdrawal from territories it occupied after the fall of Bashar al-Assad in 2024, as well as the cessation of bombings against Syrian military positions.
Several factors are pushing al-Sharaa to consider this path. However, the first obstacle comes from his internal enemies. The recent suicide bombing of a Christian church in Damascus was widely seen as an attack aimed at him. Those still aligned with the old jihadist camp are likely ready to destabilize the situation in order to thwart his shift from the old regime to the new. These individuals are particularly dangerous for him, as they come from the same circles that shaped his leadership. They are driven by ideological motivations and are probably supported by external actors who oppose the consolidation of the “Arab concert.”
Another obstacle is time. Al-Sharaa must prove to his new Arab counterparts that he is reliable, and given his opposition to political Islam, they are naturally suspicious. To buy time without losing credibility, he may have a strategy: he could show, through concrete actions, that he is following the path outlined by Joseph Aoun, the “Arab concert.” Here, an external factor beyond his control could work in his favor. Saudi Arabia is supportive of the Abraham Accords, but it wants to play a leading role. Does it plan to coordinate the Arab governments that have not yet signed the Accords but are interested in doing so? If so, al-Sharaa could indicate that he is aligning with Riyadh’s timing and its regional leadership.
But is Riyadh still truly considering a framework agreement? No one knows for certain, especially since the International Conference on the Israeli-Palestinian issue—organized by Saudi Arabia in collaboration with French President Emmanuel Macron—was postponed indefinitely, just days after the attack on Iran occurred.
The strongman of Damascus, the former jihadist al-Sharaa (formerly known as al-Joulani, “son of the Golan,” which highlights how significant it would be for him to give up the Golan Heights), may indeed intend to follow this path, as many believe. However, before proceeding, he must consolidate control over his internal front. The reaction from his new potential internal opponents could derail the process unless he quickly reaches an agreement with the other key players in Syria, namely the Kurds, Alawites, and Druze. Negotiations are ongoing, with the crucial goal of integrating as many of the militias in Syria into the new national army. These militias largely represent communities that do not feel secure under central authority. The most important and delicate discussions are currently taking place in Damascus with Kurdish leaders.
Will he succeed? A Syrian who prefers to remain anonymous observes, “Many Syrians appreciate al-Sharaa, calling him ‘one of us.’ This is especially true among Syrian Sunnis, the majority community to which he also belongs. While this is an important base of support, it comes with a challenge. Al-Sharaa will only truly be able to represent all Syrians when others—whether secular or from different communities—see him that way. Only then will he be stronger than his opponents. If he wants to be a true leader, he must build a real state.” Will he try? Will he succeed? Can he move beyond jihadism and transcend community-based identity politics?
Lebanon on the Edge: Between Openness and Hezbollah’s Anomaly
Embracing the vision of a “new Arab concert” is easier for Lebanon, even though it has never fully embraced pan-Arabism. The technical challenges of joining the Abraham Accords are also minimal, with only a minor symbolic dispute over the Shebaa Farms. There has been no real territorial dispute between Lebanon and Israel since 2000, when Israel withdrew from the southern part of the country. The “blue line” that separates the two states is nearly a defined border, with only a few contested areas. Furthermore, when it was necessary to delineate maritime borders to allow offshore drilling, Lebanon and Israel quickly reached an agreement—with Hezbollah’s consent, which played a crucial role at the time. Any potential agreement would involve the withdrawal of Israeli forces from positions in Lebanese territory that they have held since the 2024 military campaign against Hezbollah.
The new Lebanese authorities, however, appear to be favoring a broad but temporary solution. The internal situation in Lebanon remains unstable: Hezbollah, although militarily weakened compared to the recent past, is still armed. It may still function as a Lebanese political party, but its agenda remains largely determined by Iran, with decisions made in Tehran. American pressure on the Beirut authorities is now focused on setting a clear timeline for Hezbollah’s disarmament, as outlined in last year’s ceasefire agreement. This applies not only to the south of the country, where the group operated and where the Lebanese army is now stationed, but to the entire country. Disarmament is crucial, especially for the Lebanese government itself; no government can function effectively without a monopoly on weapons and force.
But how should Lebanon proceed? Beirut is asking for time. After taking control of all positions in the south, the current goal is a negotiated disarmament. In government circles, there is a belief that acting too quickly may not necessarily lead to the best outcome. However, it is equally clear that as long as the anomaly of an armed, pro-Iranian party remains in Lebanon, the “Arab concert” will have its Achilles’ heel there. Supporting Hezbollah’s transformation into a party with a Lebanese agenda—perhaps building on the social issues raised by Musa Sadr before the civil war’s darkness took hold—would be a crucial step for the country. Resolving these issues is key to starting a new era, a difficult friendship, for a legacy of a dark century that refuses to end.
Cover photo: A billboard displayed in Tel Aviv by the “Coalition for Regional Security” Israeli political-security initiative depicting, from left to right, Jordan’s King Abdullah II, Lebanon’s President Joseph Aoun, Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa, Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, US President Donald Trump, Israel’s Prime Ministe Benjamin Netanyahu, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI, and Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa, with above the Hebrew slogan “a time for war, a time for settlement; now is the time for the ‘Abrahamic Covenant'”. (Photo by Jack GUEZ / AFP)
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