The ceasefire in Gaza, tied to Donald Trump’s 20-point plan, remains extremely fragile amid repeated violations. Among the latest escalations, an Israeli air raid overnight between October 28 and 29, launched in retaliation for the death of an IDF soldier and Hamas’s refusal to return the bodies of hostages, left more than a hundred people dead. While Hamas accuses Benjamin Netanyahu’s government of obstructing the entry of humanitarian convoys, uncertainty looms over the so-called “phase two” of the plan.
On paper, the Palestinian group has agreed to relinquish direct control of the enclave, but not full demilitarization nor the international supervision envisaged by Trump’s proposed “Board of Peace.” The plan also makes no mention of the West Bank, fueling fears that Israel intends to solidify the separation between the two Palestinian territories. In this context, Reset DOC spoke with Yuli Tamir, former Israeli education minister, co-founder of the pacifist movement Peace Now, and current president of Beit Berl College, to discuss the prospects for peace and Israel’s political future.
How realistic is this plan as a path toward sustainable peace?
It’s hard to assess the situation right now. We still know little about the plan—only its general outlines—and it already seems there was no clear agreement with Hamas on disarmament, while complications remain over the return of the bodies of Israeli victims. The first days were full of hope and enthusiasm as the hostages came home, but the more we learn, the more confusing things appear.
That said, two points are important. First, the discourse Trump has brought to the Middle East is, in itself, hopeful: it’s about peace, reconciliation, and negotiation—ideas that only weeks ago seemed unimaginable. He has revived the idea of peace and even of some political arrangement for the Palestinians, whether that means a state or another political framework. We’re still far from what Trump calls “eternal peace,” but the shift from total deadlock to renewed dialogue is meaningful. It changes the framework of discussion in the region—and that is significant.
The plan for Gaza entirely overlooks the West Bank and excludes a key figure such as Marwan Barghouti, who remains in prison. Do you see this as part of a broader strategy to maintain “two Palestines”—separate and weakened?
For many years, Israel’s right-wing policy has been to separate the West Bank from Gaza. The horrific events we’ve witnessed are partly the result of Hamas’s cruelty and brutality, but also of Israel’s refusal to let the Palestinian Authority govern Gaza and to recognize Gaza and the West Bank as a single entity, as they should be. The government’s support for Hamas through Qatar was, in fact, aimed at preventing the Palestinian Authority from gaining power in Gaza and from pursuing a political solution that would unite the two territories under one framework serving Palestinian interests.
This is a key point of division between Israel’s right and left. No one on the left supports what Hamas has done or the atrocities it committed, but the crucial question is: what is the endgame? Those who seek a long-term arrangement believe the only viable path is to consider Gaza and the West Bank together—as one region that must serve the broader interests of the Palestinian people.
In a recent interview, Gilles Kepel recalled how, in 2011, Netanyahu facilitated Sinwar’s release in order to keep Gaza separate from the West Bank, entrusting it to a “manageable” Islamist leader. Do you see a risk of returning to some form of tacit pact between Israel and Hamas—especially considering the “local policing” role Hamas now seems to be playing?
From Israel’s point of view, Hamas has lost whatever legitimacy it might once have had. For anyone seeking peace and reconciliation in the Middle East, Hamas has always been an enemy—a militant, jihadist movement whose declared goal is the destruction of Israel. Israel’s past collaboration with Hamas was a deeply damaging and irresponsible mistake. The illusion that Hamas could be used for tactical purposes and then controlled when convenient has now been completely discredited.
Yet, Trump implied Hamas has been given approval to act as a Palestinian police force in Gaza “for a period of time” under the first phase of the ceasefire agreement…
Hamas remains in place because, without a political arrangement that is regional and involves the Arab countries as well as the PLO, it cannot be removed by force. Hamas will continue to exist until Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinian Authority work together to replace it—it cannot be dismantled from the outside.
Prime Minister Netanyahu made a serious mistake by not attending the gathering in Sharm el-Sheikh. That is the kind of coalition Israel should be building—one with legitimate Arab leaders who seek stability and reconciliation in the region. Instead, relying once again on Hamas or other militant groups in Gaza is an illusion.
How is Israeli public opinion responding to this agreement? After months of war, do you think there is any real openness to the idea of coexistence?
It’s still too early to tell. People were deeply relieved to see the hostages return home, and it’s hard to grasp from the outside how personally involved Israelis felt. The release was an extraordinary moment of solidarity. There hasn’t been enough time to reflect on what comes next. But it’s clear that those who supported the hostages’ return share three things: they wanted them home, they are highly critical of the Netanyahu government, and they may be open to further steps toward reconciliation—if these are part of a broader regional process.
How has the country changed since October 7, 2023?
Israel has become a very sad country. It’s a place tormented by war, trauma, and the fate of the hostages. Many people, myself included, are deeply engaged and also very critical of what has been happening in Gaza. Society is living under a heavy burden.
The return of the hostages was a powerful moment of national catharsis—but catharsis is a moment, not a process. When it passes, the weight returns. We’re still facing the same internal struggle against a government that is pushing Israel toward autocracy. The legal overhaul is back on the agenda, threatening the balance of power between the legislature and the executive. People haven’t yet had time to absorb all of this. But I believe that, within weeks, a new wave of political struggle will emerge.
Netanyahu has remained in power throughout the war, despite his ongoing corruption trials. Some analysts have suggested the conflict also served as a shield for him against accountability. What now?
After the hostages returned, there was an immediate sense of relief—but almost at once, Netanyahu’s corruption trial resumed. He is clearly doing everything possible to avoid it. He knows his vulnerabilities and is using every tool at his disposal to delay the process.
Is his absence from the Sharm El-Sheikh summit a potential signal of his imminent political downfall?
His decision not to attend the Sharm el-Sheikh summit was part of a political calculus. His government is fragile, and he fears that if it collapses, he won’t be re-elected. To preserve his position, he avoids any move that might alienate his coalition partners. We all know he even resisted efforts to release the hostages months earlier, when it might have been possible, simply to keep his government alive. This is a prime minister willing to sacrifice his own people to stay in power—and that hasn’t changed. His overriding concern remains holding on to the premiership at all costs.
Yair Lapid, the leader of Israel’s opposition, recently described international protesters against the war as “manipulated by propaganda experts funded by terror money.” How do you interpret those words?
Lapid is not much of an opposition leader—and that’s part of Israel’s current problem. The protests abroad stem from a mix of factors: the war itself, what we’ve done in Gaza, anti-Semitism, and propaganda. It’s too easy to dismiss them all as manipulation. We can see how the international mood shifted before and during the war, and how profoundly that has affected people’s perceptions. Israel has not played its cards right. By continuing the war in Gaza and causing such extensive destruction, it has acted against its own interests—both internally and externally. This was unnecessary for Israel’s security or for the hostages’ well-being. We’ve crossed a line, and the world knows it.
The real challenge now is to rebuild trust. As Trump said during his visit to Israel, you can’t fight the whole world. Israel must find a way to live with its neighbors, to reconcile, and to open a new page. The alternative—turning a blind eye, letting Hamas regain control in Gaza, and clinging to the illusion of short-term stability—is a dangerous path that only delays a real solution.
Cover photo: Members of the internal security forces loyal to the Palestinian group Hamas, man a checkpoint in the Nuseirat refugee camp in the central Gaza Strip, on October 12, 2025. Israel declared a ceasefire in Gaza and began to pull back its forces on October 10, as tens of thousands of exhausted Palestinians made their way back to their devastated homes. (Photo by Eyad Baba / AFP)
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