What is Russian patriotism?
“Democratic patriotism” differs profoundly from the European model. Sergej Karaganov – a member of the Foreign Policy and Defence Council and head of Moscow’s National Research University Higher School of Economics’ school of “Global Economics and International Affairs – emphasises that while in Europe one is observing a progressive obsolescence of the nation-state, in Russia citizens have preferred to move towards the semi-authoritarian system of a “controlled democracy” in which a patriotic defence of Russian uniqueness is the main recipe for surviving external influence. Oleg Orlov, a human rights activist at the “Memorial” centre, says that contemporary patriotism fits perfectly within the traditional Russian swaying between brief moments with an inclination for freedom and far longer periods of slavery and arbitrary power. In this perspective, the patriotic ideology is addressed at reiterating that the country is still part of the circle of “great powers.” Unfortunately, the price to be paid becomes increasingly higher in terms of a reduction of democracy and respect for human rights.
In the Moscow Echo, Vladimir Ryzhkov – a member of the PRP-Parnass party, the one the deceased Boris Nemtsov belonged to – provides a dualist interpretation of Russian patriotism. In Russia two opposite models coexist; the authoritarian and the liberal. The first supports government policies at an internal level, mobilising around the head of state – as seen in recent polls – with a real form of sacralisation of power and ferocious opposition to any criticism of the regime. At the extreme end, it instead defends the idea of a “Great Russia” and constantly appeals to the country’s super-power and imperial past. Liberal patriotism, on the contrary, hopes for Russia’s equal and sustainable development, a peaceful foreign policy based on keeping good relations with all partners, the rule of law, cutting the defence budget and increasing investments in health care, research, political decentralisation and cultural tolerance.
Patriotism and foreign policy: The European front
Over the past year, patriotism has played a fundamental role in defining the strategies of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy. The deterioration of relations with the West has fuelled the image of a “besieged fortress” and the Kremlin has also tried to unite public opinion through the creation of so-called “denigrators of Russia”. These enemies who are both external (USA-EU) and internal (liberal opposition, NGOs) must be fought as they endanger the state’s survival and that of its traditional values.
By following the Russian media it is possible to analyse events of recent months observing three different scenarios: European, Asian and Middle Eastern.
Russia’s European foreign policy has, in recent weeks, rotated around two main issues; the situation in Ukraine and the decision to withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. In March, the documentary “Crimea: way back home”, made under Putin’s strict supervision to commemorate the anniversary of Crimea’s “return home”, was broadcast. It can be considered a real and proper “manifesto” of the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Putin in fact addressed a series of important subjects, from the reasons for Russian intervention in Ukraine, to relations with the European Union and the United States. The president repeatedly emphasised how Russian intervention had been specifically requested by the Russian-speaking inhabitants of the peninsula and that Russia simply respected the principle of people’s self-determination. The documentary received very differing reactions. Aleksander Prokhanov – a famous author and editor-in-chief of the extreme right-wing conservative newspaper “Zavtra” – supported Putin’s decisions, stating that Russia had a moral obligation to intervene. Crimea is compared to an “eternal sun” shining like a miraculous star in the Russian sky, inspiring national elites to fight to achieve the “Russian miracle.” Putin has had the merit of avoiding the “toxic cloud’ of the Euro Maidan protests spreading throughout the country, and protected the bay of Simferopol from occupation by the American fleet. In the pages of the Aktual’njie Kommentarii Rostislav Ishchenko – President of the Centre for Systematic Analysis and Forecasting in Kiev – supported the thesis that the war in Ukraine is the result of a geopolitical confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation. Putin has managed to recreate Russia’s status as a great power, opposing American hegemony. Russia has managed to increase the number of allies it has in the world, strengthening relations with the BRICS group (a few days ago Putin ratified the treaty creating a $100 billion fund made available to member states), but he has also strengthened bonds with partners in Latin America, Asia and North Africa. According to the author, Putin is not, however a militarist. He wants peace because he is aware that in the long-term it will lead not only to the collapse of the regime in Kiev, but also of the international financial military system dominated by the United States.
Analyses more critical of the Kremlin’s foreign policy have also been published. Elena Chernenko – editorialist for international affairs for the Russian newspaper “Kommersant” – revisited the evolution of Russian foreign policy over recent years, emphasising how the country has betrayed some of the principles in the 2013 Foreign Concept. The annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbass have contradicted the Kremlin’s traditional opposition to the principle of a “responsibility to protect”, as well as the principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs” of a sovereign state. The question now is whether it is necessary to structurally revise national security strategies. Andreij Lipski, deputy editor-in-chief of the famous opposition newspaper Novaja Gazeta – judged the annexation of Crimea as a resounding strategic mistake made by the Kremlin. A year later, national security has decreased, while sanctions have revealed the Russian social-economic system’s structural weakness. Aleksander Podrabinek – a former dissident and human rights activist as well as editor-in-chief of the magazine “Prima”- criticised the annexation of Crimea from the pages of Ezhednevnij Zhurnal using a historical parallelism with the power policy of past centuries. The difference is that now one is aware that the annexation of new territories is not directly proportional to increased internal wellbeing. Vasilij Zharkov – Director of the Department of Political Science at Moscow’s Higher School of Economic and Social Sciences, by many considered one of the organisations most critical of the national government – compared Soviet and Russian foreign policy, saying that nowadays the Kremlin has very little to offer on the international stage. Russia has become a revisionist power, ready to threaten its neighbours with the use of force and reluctant to respect the rules of world order. The country has few friends (Byelorussia, Kazakhstan and North Korea) while citizens are resigning themselves to living in a society dominated by injustice and inequality.
Fedor Lukjanov – President of the Presidium of the Foreign Policy and Defence Council and editor-in-chief of the magazine Russia in Global Affairs presents a more balanced analysis. The foreign policy expert commented on Putin’s classic meeting with the press (a sort of “State of the Union”), observing how there has been a change of direction by the president, who is trying to move from harsh confrontation to” peaceful coexistence” with the West. This does not mean a rapprochement of positions, but rather an acknowledgement of the fact that neither the West nor the Kremlin can gain the upper hand. Both formations must therefore cooperate as much as possible to minimise the risk of an escalation and intensify dialogue, starting from specific issues such as, for example, the Iranian question. Similarly, Michajl Rostovskij – commentator for the newspaper “Moskovskij Komsomolets” (MK) famous for the provocative way in which it addresses the different issues in Russia’s political-social life – expressed the hope that the Geneva agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue will lead to greater pragmatism in foreign policy and to a rapprochement at least as far as key international security questions are concerned. Pavel Koshkin – deputy editor-in-chief of the pro-government magazine Russia beyond the Headlines, instead presents a more disillusioned analysis. Using the image of the famous meeting of Soviet and American soldiers on the Elbe River, he asks himself when the U.S. and Russia will once again “shake hands.”
The Kremlin’s decision to withdraw from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) has been criticised by Aleksander Mineev – Novaja Gazeta’s correspondent in Russia. The author has emphasised that Moscow’s participation in the Treaty had become something purely symbolic. This agreement in fact prevented the country from using military force to affirm its territorial dominion in Eastern Europe. Withdrawal from the Treaty simply confirms the new “Cold War” atmosphere with the West. Harsh reactions were also provoked by the President of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker’s proposal to form a European army. Pavel Svjatenkov – a political analyst and columnist for a number of conservative magazines – wrote in Izvestija that this initiative hides the work of NATO and the United States. A European army would represent a serious threat for pan-European security and could give rise to a situation similar to the one in the 1930s, with a new potentially bloody rivalry between Russia and Germany, all to the advantage (once again) of the Anglo-Saxon world.
A shift to the East?
Many have asked themselves whether the deterioration of relations with the West might push the Russian Federation to increasingly orient itself towards the East. According to Dmitri Trenin – a historian and director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre think tank – Putin is trying to increasingly strengthen relations with Beijing. This does not mean one will see the birth of a new Sino-Russian block over the short term. However, it seems increasingly evident that the era of post-Soviet Russia’s integration with the West is now over. The opinion expressed by Timofej Bordacev in Izvestija goes even further. The director of the Faculty of “Global Economics and International Affairs” at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow and an expert belonging to the “Valdai” – a group of 800 academics and international experts involved in promoting Russia’s role in the world through dialogue with the international intellectual community – enthusiastically asserted that 2015 will be “Eurasia” year. The coming into effect on January 1st 2015 of the Eurasian Union represents the main starting point for a new axis based on China and Russia. Eurasia enjoys a unique geopolitical and geo-economic position, with vast natural resources, and is crossed by safe transport routes able to link Eastern Europe to South-East Asia. In this context, the Eurasian Union and the new “silk road economic belt” constitute two complementary entities. The first provides the normative framework for the creation of new common transport and logistic infrastructures, while the “belt” can provide the driving force for trade and direct foreign investments. China and Russia must therefore lead opposition to American political, economic and military hegemony and it is for this reason that the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is absolutely complementary to that of the BRICS. The country’s shift to the East thus becomes part of the attempt to provide post-Soviet Russia with a new identity. As Fedor Lukjanov explained, Russia is still trying to define its borders, not so much in a political and geographical sense, but rather in a mental sense. The idea of a “Russian civilisation” or a “Eurasian identity” and the reaction to events in Ukraine, are parts of the same identity process. It is a difficult process precisely because the fall of the USSR has resulted in the loss of territories that had been part of the Russian Lebensraum for decades.
The Middle Eastern theatre and migration issues
A certain amount of space has been dedicated to events in the Middle East, in particular the crisis in Yemen and the tragedy of migrants who die in the Mediterranean. Many conservative newspapers and media attacked Saudi intervention in the country, while accusing the international community of remaining silent when faced with the clear violation of Yemeni territorial sovereignty. Alexander Mercouris – a lawyer specialising in Russian issues and human rights – writing for Sputnik International (an online English language newspaper entirely controlled by the government and therefore considered by many the Putin regime’s instrument for propaganda abroad) attacked in particular the United States administration, guilty of implementing “double standard” policies regarding its Saudi Arabian allies and the Russian Federation. While on one hand Riyadh’s offensive in Yemen was given carte blanche – as in the case of the coup in Ukraine – bitter criticism was addressed at Russia for “saving” Crimea and intervening in the Donbass.
As far as the problem involving migratory flows from North Africa is concerned, Finian Cunningham – a journalist writing for a number of newspapers including The Mirror, Irish Times and The Independent – used very harsh words against Europe in an article for Sputnik, stating that the continent is incapable of finding an effective solution for this problem, since Europe is also its cause. The massive migratory flows, in his opinion, are nothing but the result of the West’s neo-imperialist policies, which have led to the destruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Syrian and Libyan crises and now also the war in Yemen. Hence, instead of spending billions of euros to increase NATO’s budget and occupy Africa to oppose Chinese interests on the continent, Europe should instead increase humanitarian aid for these countries, perhaps abolishing their debt in order to allow them to use the few resources available to bet on more sustainable economic and social development.
Putin’s 15 years
Analysing foreign policy provides interesting clues for understanding the country’s internal political debate. Russia, in fact, appears to be divided into two macro-categories: “patriots” and members of the so-called “fifth column” referred to in a previous analysis. Patriots enthusiastically saluted the fifteenth anniversary of Putin’s rise to power. This event was celebrated with a film entitled “The President”. Many analysed the evolution of the Kremlin’s leader. Michajl Zubov for example – correspondent for MK – interviewed a series of political analysts in order to describe the manner in which the Russian leader has changed during these fifteen years. A very particular image has emerged, that of a man who, thanks to skilful compromises, has managed to strengthen the state, passing from a compliant attitude to an increasingly assertive one regarding Western partners. This resulted in intervention in Ukraine. Three events in the course of this process favoured this change. The first was the Libyan uprising and Gadhafi’s assassination, while the second coincided with mass protests in 2011 and 2012 and the third was the war in Ukraine. The new Putin is not afraid of the West, which he no longer needs and can threaten and fight at any time.
Obviously there was no lack of criticism. Evgenij Gontmacher – an economist and deputy director of the Institute of “Global Economics and International Affairs” at the Russian Academy of Sciences – wrote in MK accusing Putin of having “assassinated Gorbashev’s perestrojka.” Today’s Russia lacks a vision of the future, while change is opposed by the same kind of people who, in the seventies and eighties, took the USSR to stagnation, setting the context for its fall. Aleksej Maleshenko – an expert from the Carnegie Moscow Centre – underlined that excessive popular support for the president, constantly inflated by patriotic slogans, risks causing Putin to fall into the trap of a “personality cult”, which characterised the Brezhnev and Khrushchev eras. Aleksander Baunov – associate researcher at the Carnegie Moscow Centre and editor-in-chief of Carnegie.ru – remarked that this could have dramatic consequences for Moscow, especially if the Russian “Caesar” should suddenly step down from his position as the Kremlin’s leader. Putin has now created an authoritarian system and one that is increasingly dependent on his personal decisions.
Kirill Martynov – a columnist for Novaja Gazeta and an associate professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics – instead analysed Putin’s fifteen years at the Kremlin using a historical comparison with Stalin. The author stated that 21st century Russia is nothing but the result of Stalinism. It is no coincidence that recent polls by the Levada Centre indicate the people’s positive opinion of the Stalin period. Stalin’s rehabilitation relies on two pillars, an educational system that does not allow interpretations that are critical of the past, since one must only speak of glory and victories and school books that ignore the period of purges and identify Stalin with a period of great progress for the country. Anyone criticising this period is considered a traitor of the nation.
Translated by Francesca Simmons