The CEIS has just recently published the book entitled Regional Cooperation in South East Europe and Beyond. Challenges and Prospects, a new in-depth investigation of the dynamics characterising former Yugoslavia. He explains to Resetdoc, that “should this profile of Bosnia as an aid-assisted state become consolidate, this would be the worst possible thing for this country. Some speak of a split between the Federation and the RS. That may be possible, but I am rather sceptical. The real problem would be to see Bosnia falling into inaction”.
In Bosnia experiencing a political stalemate. Whose fault is it?
Local political leadership has without any doubt serious responsibilities. One should also say that the international community is not blameless. The dynamics of the international community’s “external” aid for economic development, the strengthening of institutions and increasing the role played by civil society are distorted. There was no virtuous circle established with local leaders. The international community has set up a series of NGOs representing a western model and perspective, relying on exporting these paradigms to the Bosnian reality. Initially in Bosnia there was a powerful idealistic impulse to help the country overcome the trauma of the war, to reconstruct civil and political society. Then came a degree of laxity. Setting up an NGO became a synonym for receiving international funds, renting expensive offices in the centre of Sarajevo, buying computers and organising conferences as well as travelling abroad. What we are seeing is a phenomenon I would call the “NGO-isation” of society. I no longer see that impulse in society that was present at the end of the Eighties, when the Citizens’ Alternative Parliament was created (in August 1996), an initiative addressed at transforming the drive of citizens into political power. This was possible at the time, and furthermore, one should remember that the opposition won the 2000 elections bringing to power an Alliance for Change (2001-2002). The question I would ask today is the following: why all these millions of dollars spent to strengthen civil society when this society does not exist? Workers who travelled to Bosnia during the Nineties had solid motivations; they were ready to roll up their sleeves and work hard in difficult conditions. People respected them because they knew what they were doing and how hard they worked. It was a pioneering stage. Now, members of the international community travel to Sarajevo because life is good there and they like their comforts. Finally, I would also say that there is a “generational” problem in Bosnia.
What do you mean by that?
The point is that for some years now a new generation has emerged, potentially representing “fresh” social forces, and not linked to the legacy of the war. This generation has ideas and a lot of goodwill and wants to change things. But then they are held back by the “old people”, politicians who emerged from the war and whose idea of society is based on the patterns of the conflict. I think it would be important to implement positive dynamics to allow these two groups to communicate, ensuring that their interaction is genuine and a contribution to the emergence of new political dynamics. It is obvious that this process must be local and not externally manipulated.
The Oscar winning film director Boris Tanovic has now entered the arena hoping to reawaken Bosnia from its lethargy. Is this perhaps one of society’s jolts?
I hope that Tanovic’s operation will contribute to giving the country a positive “shock”. Sadly I fear that society does not have the will to introduce change. Tanovic’s should be praised above all because he has decided to return to his homeland to improve it. Objectively I am a little sceptical. That said, the world of culture is extremely dynamic in Bosnia, although partly separated from the world of politics and disillusioned by it (“the world of politics is corrupt, one can expect nothing from it”). Tanovic’s move could reconnect culture and politics, providing the political world with new energy since it must start its revolution from within.
If there is such a thing, what is the exit strategy?
Generally speaking what needs to be done is known. The importance of certain institutions and Cantons should be reduced and they should be replaced by Regions, while the role played by municipalities should be increased. Basically, a non-ethnic institutional structure is needed. This is possible but it needs to be done at the right moment. I was in Mostar in 2005 and met with the leaders of the HDZ 90 (one of the “Croatian” political parties). We discussed health reforms and observed that there was political consensus for providing health care within the framework of a regionalisation of Bosnia, hence moving beyond ethnic boundaries. This proves that where there is a will to implement reforms they can be implemented. Reforms for the Police Force instead, approved with no conviction, have remained blocked for years in spite of being politically far more sensitive. And all this damages the EU integration process.
How will it be possible to move forward from the Dayton Peace Agreement?
There are two requisites. The first is that the international community must be the guarantor of a new agreement, and work to manage the Dayton reform process and write a new Constitution. The international community should have a very flexible approach in managing and monitoring this process. Last year the former Slovenian President, Milan Kucan, proposed a new conference on the Balkans, to discuss the country and of course also all other open issues concerning Bosnia. But the problem is that the international community does not wish to make any more mistakes regards to Bosnia and is paralysed by this fear. The United States and the European Union speak of a “Pandora’s Box”, and believe that opening this box could multiply the many existing problems. To speak of a Pandora’s Box however is only an excuse for doing nothing. The advantage of an international conference, should one be decided, would be to at last move beyond the Dayton agreements. The disadvantage would be that this would be an external and imposed solution. To soften this effect, the second condition comes into play, and that is Bosnian society’s political will to move beyond the Dayton agreement. Then we are back to square one. To obtain political consensus, to compose the various parties, one needs a strong society. Such a strong society does not exist for the moment and politicians such as Milorad Dodik manage to get their own way without any opposition preventing them from doing this. To shake Bosnia from within and send a strong message to the “external world”, so that the international community will act, we need a strong, dynamic and creative personality to emerge in Bosnia, someone like Sarkozy or Obama. In the end, who knows, perhaps Tanovic! Someone of national and international importance, capable of giving voice to change and of transforming renewal issues into political ones.
Translation by Francesca Simmons