After the publication of Postliberalism: The New Politics of Meaning (2021), by Adrian Pabst, the ranks of those criticizing liberalism and liberal democracies have grown – particularly those who take upon themselves the task of moving beyond a political phase marked by discontent and the erosion of democracy on a global scale. Some authors attempt to give meaning to this “post” by framing it as an alternative to both neoliberalism and populism. These include conservative thinkers (like Patrick Deneen), religious and theologically engaged figures (like John Milbank), and others who push their critique of liberal universalism to the edge of reactionary extremism (like Yoram Hazony), to the point that they appear more anti- than post-liberal. Pabst, a British political philosopher and Catholic, represents a more moderate, reformist version of this trend. He argues that modern liberalism has exhausted its capacity to give meaning to political, social, and economic life – because radical individualism, combined with a socially unbound market and a technocratic state, has reduced the human being to a consumer.
But let’s hear directly from him.
“The crisis of democracy in the West is, to a large extent, the crisis of liberalism. Liberalism – understood as individualism, as the primacy of individual will and subjective rights, as a formal, procedural, and utilitarian politics – is at the heart of this crisis. It simply isn’t rooted in our humanity. Societies don’t function solely on the basis of choice, consent, and contract. These are important, of course, but they are not sufficient to sustain a plural and vibrant democracy.
In the postwar era, modern liberalism coexisted with a network of social and civic bonds – a whole set of intermediary institutions that mediated between individuals and the institutions of the state and the market. Without these, democracy struggles. Even the core principle of representative government – which is precisely what’s in crisis today – ceases to function. People aren’t represented only through their individual will. They must also be represented in terms of profession, place, and belonging. Today, liberal democracy no longer reflects these dimensions – and that’s why it is dysfunctional and provokes backlashes: populism, authoritarianism. Liberal democracy itself risks becoming increasingly authoritarian.”
What comes after liberalism?
“It could be worse – because progress is never guaranteed – unless we change course. Post-liberalism seeks to rethink the foundations of democracy: greater participation, better political elites, and the institutional and policy tools needed to overcome liberalism’s self-erosion and the deep democratic malaise that now runs through the West.”
There is a general critique of what doesn’t work in democracy, and economic dissatisfaction is a crucial part of it. What can a post-liberal perspective offer here?
“This is a key question. Trust in liberal democracy was, for a long time, built on a promise of prosperity and progress – the belief that each generation would be better off than the previous one. Whether in terms of income, decent pay, dignified living, or the ability to accumulate some assets – buying a home, saving, building a future for oneself and one’s family – that promise has faded.
Forty years ago, it was possible to raise a family with two or three children on a single salary – even with the mother staying home. (Let me be clear: I strongly support women’s right to work, whenever and however they choose, and especially the right to return to work after maternity if that’s what they want.) But already twenty years ago, even two incomes barely ensured a secure life. Today, many can’t even afford to rent or pay a mortgage.
We’ve seen two trends: extraordinary wealth concentration at the top 20 percent – some astronomically rich – and growing insecurity among the middle 40 percent. The bottom 20–30 percent face precariousness, poverty, or destitution. The whole promise of shared prosperity is no longer valid. We’re moving backwards – on income, wealth, social mobility, job security, and working conditions.
This erodes trust, because the promise remains – but reality contradicts it. People are asking: where are we headed with the global economy, the knowledge economy, student debt, and rising costs? There’s a growing backlash against a model – often called “neoliberalism” – that no longer works.”
That critique isn’t so far from what social democrats or traditional socialists say about capitalism.
“True, but there are at least two key differences. First, we believe the crisis is both economic and cultural. These dimensions are not separate. They can be distinguished, but must be addressed together. People aren’t just underpaid – they also lack meaning in their work. We need not just more and better-paying jobs, but jobs that offer purpose and fulfillment.
The same goes for housing: it’s not just about physical shelter – it’s about emotional and social stability, a sense of belonging. So we must reconnect economy and culture. It’s not just about ‘the economy, stupid’ (to quote Bill Clinton’s campaign slogan), and it’s not just about a cultural backlash, as many say of populism. It’s both. The world is material and symbolic.
Second, we need to rethink capitalism itself. It is a system built around the individual, their will and desires – which connects it to liberalism. It’s not enough to regulate markets or expand the state. Too often, state and market collude against society – as Karl Polanyi observed. We need to re-embed the economy and politics in social ties.
That means strengthening intermediary institutions, encouraging socially purposed businesses, and transforming both state and market from within – not just balancing one against the other. Too much of social democracy believes the answer is more state and less market. We argue instead for a different kind of state and a different kind of market – and for transforming both together.”
But today’s political scene is marked by polarization that has devoured the deliberative dimension of democratic life. Think of Trumpism, which pushes the limits of democratic norms, while the opposition struggles to respond. Think of Europe: France, divided between far-right and far-left; Germany, with a rising and dangerous far right. In such a context, how can post-liberalism be represented or applied?
“At the moment, there is no leader, party, or movement that fully embodies a coherent post-liberal agenda. But there are encouraging signs – in political debate and policy shifts.
Take Denmark, for example. The Social Democratic government led by Mette Frederiksen – seemingly a classic center-left coalition – has taken an unusual turn. First, it acknowledged that the working class didn’t abandon the party; it was the party that abandoned them. Second, it combined openness to immigration with a strong focus on integration, emphasizing language learning and cultural cohesion to avoid self-segregated, ghettoized communities.”
A kind of communitarian realism?
“Exactly. And we see similar signs elsewhere. In the UK, Keir Starmer’s Labour Party may look conventional at first glance, but some recent moves point to a more communitarian, post-liberal orientation – on issues such as immigration, defense, industrial policy, and regional regeneration.
There’s a conscious effort to move beyond the old liberal consensus of deregulation and unrestrained globalization. Instead, we’re hearing talk of trade policies that support local communities, protect workers, food standards, and the environment.”
And in the United States?
“It’s a different context, but figures like JD Vance are bringing post-liberal themes into mainstream debate. I disagree with him on Ukraine and immigration – there are major differences – but he’s right to point out something crucial: the West is losing confidence in its own traditions. Western civilization – with all its flaws – is still worth defending. Free speech, for example, is a non-negotiable good.
Where I part ways with Vance is on compassion and solidarity. A post-liberalism worthy of the name must combine civic strength with social empathy. Otherwise, it risks becoming just another form of illiberalism.”
Do you see a resonance between Pope Francis’s legacy – especially Fratelli Tutti – and your post-liberal vision? And could this resonance continue under Leo XIV?
“Absolutely. I find it deeply troubling when some try to dismiss Pope Francis’s legacy as simply liberal or progressive. That view completely misses the depth of his faith. His interventions – Laudato Si’, Fratelli Tutti – are rooted in a deep sense of solidarity and compassion for the vulnerable. That’s exactly where Christianity should be grounded.
His contribution to Catholic social thought is significant. He reminded us that nature is our common home, and that we have a moral duty to care for it – not exploit or destroy it. Fratelli Tutti emphasizes fraternity, which goes even beyond solidarity by stressing the importance of personal encounter.
Francis’s legacy is fully in line with his predecessors, John Paul II and Benedict XVI. The style and language may differ, but the underlying thought is remarkably coherent. I believe Pope Leo XIV will carry this legacy forward – affirming Catholic social thought as a gift to the wider world. Its goal is to reconcile us with one another, and with our shared humanity.”
But within the post-liberal spectrum, there are also very conservative – even reactionary – currents. Think of Patrick Deneen: Why Liberalism Failed was provocative, but Regime Change takes a very hard-line stance, calling for elite replacement in heavily conservative or even aristocratic terms. Then there’s Yoram Hazony, who seems openly anti-liberal and reactionary. How do you distinguish your position from theirs?
“That’s an important distinction. Some figures labeled post-liberal are actually more anti-liberal than post-liberal. The post-liberalism that I – and many of my colleagues – support is not anti-liberal. We don’t seek to dismantle liberalism, but to move beyond it. Liberalism, on its own, is insufficient. If we care about rights, freedoms, and the dignity of the person, then we need more than just liberal values – because liberalism often erodes the very principles it claims to uphold.”
What kind of state does post-liberalism envision for the future?
“When individual freedoms collide, who decides? Often it’s the state – and not always in a liberal direction. Our response isn’t to reject liberalism entirely, but to recover values like personal dignity, the value of work, and a more relational vision of society one that balances individual expression with the role of communities and groups.
We argue for a plural conception of the state – where sovereignty is shared, internally and internationally. We are internationalists and pluralists. National conservatives, by contrast, are often majoritarians who risk imposing uniformity. Their model resembles Rousseau’s general will, imposed from above. Ours emphasizes communities, associations, and mediation.
That’s why – even if some post-liberal currents contain anti-liberal tendencies – many are still built on deeply liberal premises. We reject both extremes.”
Cover photo: A man argues with an anti-gay religious protestor (R) at the 2023 LA Pride Parade on June 11, 2023 in Hollywood, California. The LA Pride Parade marks the last day of the three-day Los Angeles celebration of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) social and self-acceptance, achievements, legal rights, and pride. (Photo by Robyn Beck / AFP)