On August 29th a message read; “The international community cannot remain indifferent to efforts to destabilise #Syria, especially acts against ethnic/religious minorities.” The reference is to the confrontation between Sunni Muslims of the FSA and the Alawites, who currently hold power in spite of their small population. It was Hafez, father of the current president, Bashar al-Assad and founder of the current Syrian regime, who handed absolute power to his son. He was Alawite as is his son.

Strategic Interests

These two quotes are just a taste of the Russian position. Moscow, aside from labelling the rebels as extremists, is opposed to the sanctions that the West would like to impose on Syria through the U.N.

Why this approach? Much is explained by strategic interests the Kremlin has in play. Syria has been Russia’s closest ally in the Arab world since the Cold War. And now it is Russia’s only ally. Russia, which has been selling weapons to the regime and has warships docked at the un-renounceable strategic Mediterranean outlet Syrian port of Tartus, has everything to lose with regime change.

Additionally, Russia does not want to re-experience being burned as it was in Libya. When the U.N. Security Council voted for sanctions against Gaddafi, the Russian ambassador abstained from voting because with his veto he would have, in substance, signalled approval of Gaddafi’s brutal repression. But, according to Moscow’s narrative, this responsible gesture was seen in the West as a green light for the offensive against the Gaddafi regime and annulled various economic agreements with it. This is why every sanction proposal put forward in the Security Council by the Americans, British and French has been summarily vetoed by Russia’s Ambassador Vitaly Churkin.

Domino Effect?

The fact that its strategic interests may be compromised is not Russia’s only fear. The other, as we have seen, is the supposed jihadist nature of the FSA. There is, undoubtedly, among the insurgents a desire for revenge against the Alawites, but the radical religious element does not appear to hold sway. Raising its spectre can be useful to de-criminalize Assad, who was able, through a well-crafted international marketing campaign before the revolt, to construct international credibility as a protector of balance between identity and faiths.

It is not enough. Russia fears that should Damascus fall, it would initiate a domino effect that could weaken Shi’a Iran, towards which Russia is not as negative as the West, and would unleash various radical Sunni groups in the Middle East, up into the republics of the Caucasus and into Russia itself. Radical organizations have been fighting for some time, especially in Dagestan and Ingushetia, which have been more unstable than Chechnya, and give new impetus to their struggle.

Impossible Evacuations

There is another reason for Moscow’s choice, which until now has remained unspoken and that is the presence in Syria of thousands of Russian citizens. A good number are made up of women, at least 20,000, who met young Syrian students studying at Soviet universities in the ‘60s and ‘70s and chose to go with them when they finished their studies. The Kremlin does not have the capability of evacuating these people, who are daily under threat by the fighting. The operation would cost too much, wrote the New York Times in an article some time ago. In other words, it is better if Assad is not swept aside.

There is also the 50,000 strong Circassian minority in Syria. They originally came from the southern republics of Russia and were forced into exile by the Tsarist occupation. The Syrian civil war could force them into a reverse exile, towards the lands they originally came from, but Russia would very much like to avoid the pressure of refugees. It is not easy, also because the issue is attracting media attention and activists are asking that Moscow, by giving refuge to the Circassians, are righting the wrongs inflicted during the Tsarist period. In the mean time, the Kremlin is “covering itself” by warning everyone about unforeseen ethno-religious outcomes of the Syrian conflict.

Other Possible Scenarios

So far it has been able to prevent Assad from falling, but Russia is also envisaging a scenario involving a change in leadership. Periodically, especially when the war favours the rebels, there are pronouncements containing openings for a political transition and indicating that there is someone in Moscow, where pragmatic logic holds sway, who feels that Assad will leave sooner or later. It is therefore better to mitigate the position, so that when the fateful moment arrives, they can save the salvageable.

Translated by Francesca Simmons

Image: cc Freedomhouse