The “frozen conflicts” in the former USSR
The agreement on a permanent ceasefire in eastern Ukraine has inspired various commentators to envisage a possible frozen conflict scenario. In the post-Soviet area, for frozen conflicts one means the existence of unrecognized republics that have appeared in autonomous areas and regions in the various countries of the former USSR following brief armed conflicts. There are currently four today in various states of being; Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. These unrecognized entities are all supported, directly or indirectly, by the Russian Federation and have a strategic function, which is to prevent the eventual integration of the states they belong to from joining European-Atlantic organisations.
Moscow is basing its strategy on the assumption that NATO will not extend to countries that do not have full sovereignty over their own territory. Should such countries join NATO, the ongoing risk of a frozen conflict becoming a full-blown war, with the eventual involvement of Russian forces “to defend minorities”, would open the possibility of direct confrontation between NATO and Russia. A risk, Russia is betting, NATO would prefer to avoid.
Repeating the process?
The possibility of the conflict in eastern Ukraine becoming a frozen conflict, could be the achievement of Russia’s strategic objective. In other words, territorial detachment in eastern Ukraine will guarantee the pro-Russian provinces a kind of veto on foreign policy choices by the government in Kiev. Not having achieved their objective through a federal proposal for Ukrainian constitutional reform, the frozen conflict option could have become Moscow’s more desirable one. A republic in eastern Ukraine endowed with statehood is unlikely to be recognized by the West and Kiev, but would be sufficient to impede Ukraine from joining NATO, at least in its current territorial configuration. Should Ukraine want to continue with a policy of integration with the West, it would have to officially recognize the separatist republic and with it, a considerable amount of territory. In such a case, it would be forced to renounce ambitions involving European or Atlantic integration until such a time as it regained sovereignty over the break-away provinces. But, as has been demonstrated, Moscow has the capacity and will to prevent this from happening through the use of force.
With the example of Transnistria in 1992 as a frame of reference, it is enough to create a permanent ceasefire to create a de facto entity in eastern Ukraine. However, compared to other frozen conflicts, Ukraine remains a specific case that presents considerable elements of risk. For example, Transnistria has many natural borders with Moldova and is ethnically and linguistically Slavic, which distinguishes it from the territory to the west of the Dnestr River, controlled by the government in Chisinau. Equally, the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have always been clear. In the Ukrainian case, the border of so-called Novorossija – the name given to the new entity by the separatists, is much less well-defined from an administrative, historical, ethnic or linguistic perspective. In other words, the definition of such a border is simply the outcome of military operations, with the result that the two sides would continue having reasons to re-spark a conflict. This, especially considering that the sides could become more than just two should irregular militias, potentially not controlled by governments, both recognized and unrecognized ones, emerge from ongoing political processes.
The lesser of two evils?
The hypothesis of a stabilization of the Ukrainian crisis into a frozen conflict presents serious dangers. As mentioned, an unrecognized republic would come into existence on a fluid border that could be an ulterior cause of additional instability in the future. Like other unrecognised republics, it could transform itself into a hub of illegal trade, an aspect that is decidedly worrying seeing the potential size of Novorossija compared to the other small and isolated unrecognised republics. It would certify the West as impotent when faced with the revisionist designs of other powers in the international system, with subsequent effects on other geopolitical situations.
And yet, the alternatives risk being less attractive than yet another frozen conflict. Western nations could support Ukraine with armaments to regain the separatist provinces. All in all, the West and Ukraine, have already underestimated Russian determination, and the consequences of new errors in judgment could be serious. Additionally, given the complexity of the situation in the field, it is not excluded that such armaments could end up in the hands of irregular forces, or be used against civilians.
Therefore, considering that Ukraine is of dubious strategic importance for the U.S. and Europe, the hypothesis of a frozen conflict, which would resolve the question of the limits of NATO and EU enlargement in the short term, could be something less unacceptable that it first appears.
Translated by Francesca Simmons