Said Essaidi brought to the ministry a long career in academia, being a professor of sociology, and progressive politics, having been a member of the defunct Moroccan Communist Party, which allowed him to understand and address the real issues that required political will to put an end to the woes of Moroccan women. This reform-oriented initiative was met with a huge political fuss orchestrated by the conservative forces that consider themselves the guardians of the Moroccan values. The result of the ensuing intellectual and political jostling was unique, and could only happen in Morocco at the time, given the antipodal nature of the diverse actors who found themselves in the midst of a deep societal debate which required both political will and popular support to come to fruition. I said that that debate could only take place in Morocco at that point in time exactly for the following reasons: 1) a smooth transition had just happened between two kings who shared everything but the style of government; Hassan II passed away and his son Mohamed VI was enthroned. 2) A political alternation government was put in place and was led by the USFP; the sworn enemy of the monarchy and the administrative parties for almost five decades and finally 3) the existence of a large margin of freedom of speech whose foundation rested on independent journalism and a dynamic civil society.

I find the debate about individual liberties, including sexual freedom, healthy and necessary to have in Morocco even if large sections of society find it threatening to what they consider their social and religious values. Firstly, being able to have an open debate about anything and everything is a sign of maturity in any given society, and Moroccans pretend that they have reached that maturity with the new constitution, and hence this debate is a litmus test to prove the genuinity of this maturity. Secondly, moving forward and building a democratic system, where all trends and tendencies are represented and respected, requires debate and intellectual confrontations at the end of which consensus is reached. Thirdly, no matter how aggressive, debate creates apposite conditions for compromises; it spreads and raises awareness about challenges faced by society; and hence engenders a collective search for common ground to negotiate ways to implement the ineluctable change. Sexual freedom is but the tip of the iceberg of a colossal array of issues that need deep consideration beyond bigotry and emotional reactions. A rational debate can yield results but emotional reactions are but yelling in the desert oblivious of the forward movement of the caravan of human progress.

What came to be known under the name of sexual freedom debate in Morocco started with Al-Ahdath Al Mahribia’s editor-in-chief brave live interview with the newly launched Lebanon-based Al Mayadeen TV. He commented on the resolutions made by a panel organized by AMDH (Moroccan Association for Human Rights) in Rabat on June 20th, 2012, under the theme “The Role of the Human Rights Movement in Preserving Individual Liberties”; the panel addressed publicly the violation of Moroccan people’s right to sexual freedom because of the persistence of article 490 in the Moroccan Criminal Law. The journalist expressed his support for the abrogation of the aforesaid article and called the Moroccan government to “stop incriminating love” and consensual sexual relations between adults out of wedlock. However, a sheikh who is very active on YouTube, picked up the interview and made it the topic of one his religious sermons. He commented on the journalist’s opinion and he mentioned an old saying that goes along the lines of “killing those who have no jealousy” in passing; a saying that Dr. Mohamed El Maghraoui, a renowned Salafi scholar, considered null and void since it is neither a hadith (a saying of the prophet) nor a verse of the Quran, and thus no legal consequences can ensue from it. YouTube Sheikh propounded what he thought was the legal punishment for the “grave crime” of inciting people to have sex out of marriage. However, this whole issue was blown out of proportion because the statement of the journalist was maliciously misquoted online to say that he was fine with his mother, sisters and wife having sex with whomever they want while in reality he never said that. The same could be said about the reactions of the YouTube Sheikh whose words were interpreted to say that he “ordered the killing of the journalist”. Justice is now adjudicating this case between the two parties. Yet, I think that it is important to delve into the unsaid in the debate around sexual freedom and try to analyze its imbrication with hegemony, domination, patriarchy and dictatorship whose success depends on disciplining the body to defuse the popular will to make change.

Sexual freedom has been at the heart of political and academic concerns in Morocco ever since late sixties, albeit sporadically. Moroccan youth lived the sexual revolution of the 1970s as an important opportunity to bring about social and political change. That generation witnessed the events of 1968 in France and the gathering of 40.000 hippies and their march in Golden Gate Park in San Francisco. Moreover, they shared the conviction that a sexual revolution was necessary and was indeed primordial to subverting the political and social order that fettled modernization and progress of the Moroccan society. As of the mid-eighties, sociologist, Samia Naaman Guessous, studied the theme of sex. In her book, “Beyond All Shame”, she deconstructs the notion of “shame” in its connection to relations of power and domination exercised over women through their sexuality. Moreover, she advocated for the end of the duality that exists in the Moroccans’ sexual life; she pondered over the reasons from which the secrecy shrouding Moroccans’ sexual lives participate. In addition to these political claims and academic interest, AMDH, the human rights stronghold of the Moroccan left, has always called for the abrogation of any laws that encroach on individual rights in their universal sense, including article 490 of the Penal Code. This latter, according to AMDH, contradicts UN’s basic human rights conventions, and provides no guarantees that individual rights will not be violated; moreover, the association, in full harmony with its conviction that human rights are one block that cannot be dealt without selectively, had no qualms about making its opinion public. AMDH’s position tossed the debate into the public arena in a totally transformed political paysage, in which PJD (Justice and Development Islamist Party) is at the helm of the government, and most of the progressive parties are in opposition. It is needless to say that Arab Revolutions have widened the space of freedom of speech, by shifting the parameters of what is allowed and what it is not. The reconfiguration of the Moroccan political life by reforms, initiated by the monarchy, and expedited by the Arab revolutions, albeit many a commentator look askance at them, contributed greatly to opening this debate publicly.

A meticulous observer will definitely notice that Morocco has witnessed a smart and gradual normalization with sex amidst the abovementioned advocacy, political and academic work. A study, published by Dier Spiegel in October 20th 2006, found that Muslim youth are about to launch a sexual revolution in their countries; Morocco, Lebanon and Egypt were witnessing a silent sexual revolution according to the study. The case of Morocco is not surprising because the country has indeed witnessed a silent cultural change about sex through education. Students at the primary school are exposed to concepts about reproduction and family planning as early as 6th grade. They are exposed at this early, at the age of 12/11, to the functions of the reproductive system, different STDs and ways to protect themselves from contracting such illnesses. My understanding is that such an early exposure indicates the Ministry of National Education’s consciousness of the fundamental importance of protecting society from STDs and providing students with the minimum knowledge necessary to be sexually responsible. It is worth mentioning that these lessons were included in the curriculum as early 1990s. I can allege that Der Spiegel’s conclusion corroborates this silent but steady cultural change about sex and sexuality.

This normalization with sex manifests itself in Moroccan daily life though language (Amazigh and Arabic). It is commonplace to hear words such as “sock/capote”; referring to condoms. This confirms the widespread existence of sex out of marriage, and people’s awareness of the necessity to protect themselves from the consequence of such a risky indulgence. Another dimension of this normalization can be inferred from the widespread use of contraceptives both in rural and urban centers. Contraceptives are distributed free of charge by the Ministry of Health, for married and divorced women alike, but they are also accessible to sex workers. These practices are so ingrained in social practices that the first reaction when a woman gets accidentally pregnant would be “how dumb she is! She did not protect herself” or “she behaved as if there were no tools to protect herself”; this confirms the normalcy of out-of-wedlock sex in Moroccan society regardless of the thick secrecy enveloping it. The phrasing of the two above-mentioned examples elucidates that women end up shouldering the brunt of illicit sex’s social consequences. It is not fair to women; it is high time men are also held accountable for their sexual behavior. Additionally, these developments, if analyzed in comparison with France of 1970s, prove that Morocco has indeed witnessed (and is witnessing) a sexual revolution despite a strong social penchant to keep it secret.

This cherished secrecy is apparent in shunning debate about sex in the media and in public spaces. The Moroccan television, unless ideologically motivated to prove a point like in the case of Abdellah Tai, refuses to serve as a platform where this debate could be had. Literature has also suffered for many years from censorship of avant-garde literary works with a leitmotif of sex. Mohammed Choukri, for instance, was ostracized for many years in the wake of the publication of his masterpiece “For Bread Alone”; he was only habilitated in 1999 when the country witnessed a political transition from Hassan II to his son, Mohamed VI. Choukri was rejected because of the aggressive intimacy he infused in his vivid description of his temporary multiple sexual encounters; a political decision was made to send him to oblivion. Choukri’s rejection could also be considered a retribution for a seditionist who undertook the task of subverting the concept of “immaculate society”; clean of all depravation and moral corruption. Choukri sinned deadly when he undertook the task of reflecting “the hidden face” and “hidden practices” of his society on the mirror of literature. This enterprise shattered the perfect image society and power-holders had of themselves and of their society on the rock of literature. The Moroccan literary critic Salah Natij suggests that we, Moroccans, “accept that there is prostitution on the streets, but we do not accept a literary figure prostitutes him- or herself. Prostitution on the streets is simply a fact, prostitution in literature becomes a cause” (Arabic Literature, Postmodern Perspectives, p. 462). Prostitution, as an extant practice in society, is a reality whose recurrence turns it into a trite and commonplace unnoticeable practice; but when it becomes the topic of literary works, its shakes off that commonplace character to be a subject of reflection and analysis, seen with fresh eyes. Chourki’s crude and realistic literary style tarnished that deeply ingrained self-purity, immaculacy and angelic cleanliness cherished by the Moroccan collective memory.

For Bread Alone could be read as a generation’s struggle against authority to free their bodies and minds from domination both in colonial and postcolonial settings (Arabic Literature, Postmodern Perspectives, p. 462). It is part of a premeditated but undeclared effort to subvert the repression of Moroccans by restoring their right to share their intimacy through literature without any sense of “shame”. This latter is the source of the contradiction between reality and rhetoric that everybody is complaining about in Morocco. Political and social oppression benefits from this pernicious concept; how many people suffer in silence without being able to voice their woes because of shame? Shame, this cherished moral value that teaches modesty and keeping to one’s own, is intrumentalized politically to repress, consecrate and defile. Only silent people are good citizens because they don’t criticize anything; those who protest lack respect, and hence society failed in educating them. Florence Rochefort, the French historian, talks about the “overlap between the cultural and the political”, and it is certainly true when we talk about sexual freedom in Morocco that the weight of political is heavier than the weight of the cultural aspects of the debate. Michel Foucault’s seminal thesis on body and power in his masterpiece “Discipline and Punish” (1975) can be definitely applied the Makhzen’s vision of Moroccan people’s sexual life.

This overlap between the cultural and political is explicitly apparent in Hassan II’s stance on modernity. Hassan II saw no benefit in Modernity if it was “intended to eliminate the concept of family and the spirit of duty towards it; and allow freedom of sexual relations between men and women, and permissiveness in attire which offends people’s feelings. If this is what modernity means, then I would prefer Morocco to be considered a country living in the Middle Ages and not in modernity” (Memory of a King, p 147). For Hassan II, sexual freedom is part of a modernity that he rejected; modernity, according to his negative understanding of it, threatens the very existence of family and the sense of duty in society, and thus there is no room for it among Moroccans. It is better for Moroccans, according to Hassan II’s logic, to live in the Middle Ages than seeing their families disintegrate because of permissiveness and rebellion that ensue from it. Shrewd politician as he was, he did not provide a clear definition for modernity; he did not try to include any positive thoughts either. Modernity is only associated with negative values that threaten everything that is dear to the Moroccan people; and hence the King, being the Commander of the Faithful, he made the choice for the Moroccan family to shun this nefarious concept. It would also have been helpful to know what Hassan II meant by family; was he referring to the smallest unit in society, that is spouses and kids, or to a figurative family made of society and the Makhzen? My understanding is that Hassan II meant the latter. Modernity meant the end of political and cultural values dear to Hassan II. It is clear from these paragraphs that sexual freedom masks a deeper layer that is fundamentally related to domination and power structure in the country.

Some Moroccan commentators believe that this whole debate about sexual liberty is artificial and superfluous. They advance the following reasons, among others, to justify their position: 1) they believe that the current debate does not emanate from a societal need since extramarital relations are outlawed de jure and they are exercised de facto. 2) They consider sexual freedom a classicist claim motivated by the interests of a prosperous and westernized class whose Moroccanness is not representative of the ‘deep Moroccan society”. 3) A big number of those who consider themselves secular and liberal, especially among party leadership, wallow in explicit contradictions between their rhetoric and political behavior. On the one hand, they defend sexual freedom but on the other hand they are staunch defenders of the Makhzen’s policies, and some of them even embarked on its project to crack down on February 20th Movement. They are, therefore, accused of selectivity and of paying lip service to human rights and individual freedom to embarrass their political contenders (Islamists in this case). 4) They also allege that Morocco faces dire challenges which require a synergy of efforts to secure basic rights such as a good education, an impartial justice and access to a reliable health system and respect of human dignity of Moroccans. This faction of Moroccans consider any debate about sexual freedom a luxury; and Moroccan people, according to them, cannot afford to waste their time mulling over luxury issues.

The critics of sexual freedom might be right in their contention that Moroccan society faces more urgent and challenging issues. However, human rights activists’ logic is different from that of social and political activists’; the latter think in terms of “gain” and “loss” which they either try to optimize, in case of the first, or minimize in case of the second while Human Rights activist defend what is right. This human rights imbued spirit governs the positions of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights, the fortress of the Moroccan Left, in its defense of human rights in their universality, unity and without selectivity. AMDH leaves no room for selectivity or segmentation when human rights are in question. The association’s president, Khadija Riadi, reiterated, in the aforementioned panel, organized under the theme “Individual Liberties and the Role of the Human Rights Movement in Morocco”, the association’s official position that basic individual rights of Moroccan people, such as the freedom of conscience and sexual freedom, are consistently violated. Additionally, she also reiterated AMDH’s conviction that freedom is not synonymous to anarchy; she urged the government to pass laws that guarantee the responsible exercise of these freedoms in the footsteps of democratic countries.

Debates about sex are highly volatile and stir deep emotions. The antipodal positions of the multiple stakeholders in Moroccan political arena, and their bravado’s lack of honesty, make the debate even thornier. Yet, the mere fact that the debate has gone public, this time, is a sign of a deep change that is gestating in the deepest layers of society. This debate would not have happened publicly without the Arab people’s revolutions thanks to which freedom of speech gained more space. The conservative forces are fighting an existential battle against freedom that threatens their very existence. Freedom threatens their moral and political authority, and hence their recourse to moralizing/religious discourse is only a tactic to remind everybody of their importance as “guards of values”. Values built around the fettering concept of “h-shuma” (shame) which hides complex and complicated power relations whose implications warrant deeper and long term research to investigate. I think that by engaging in this debate, Moroccan society is freeing itself from the shackling veneration of the past and its myths.