This interview was originally published by the daily newspaper Il Messaggero, on July 21st 2008, on page 2, and entitled “Italy and Europe run the same risk. In a global world those who stand divided will lose”.
Until a few months ago it seemed that the deadlock experienced by international organisations such as the EU and the UN would result in actually changing the destiny of these bodies. The global economic crisis projected these emergencies on society at a speed that resulted in world public opinion experiencing fear and bewilderment. President Amato, is there any sense at all in still discussing a European Constitution, or is there instead a fear that it is too late?
No, on the contrary, it is time to speed up this process, achieving the mission citizens expect from Europe. Unfortunately, after Ireland’s rejection of the Lisbon Treaty, we have seen a return of the stereotypes used in existential debates. The kind of discussion used in psychoanalysis. It is said that Europe is distant from its citizens, that it no longer has a mission nor the spirit of its founding fathers. This is not true. While there are no longer powerful post-war feelings, Europe has not disappeared from the consciousness of its citizens. On the contrary, it is so deeply-rooted that it represents the highest level of government of a system that stimulates different expectations, depending on whether these expectations are the competence of individual states or rather the supra-national responsibility of the EU. Citizens wish Europe to address issues such as globalisation, immigration, international terrorism, the energy challenge and climate change. Criticism arises because citizens are not sufficiently satisfied with the solutions provided. They express dissatisfaction in a similar manner when their States do not address issues concerning pensions, welfare and education.
Jacques Attali in France, and Giulio Tremonti in Italy, identify the reason for the West’s crisis in the dictatorship of market-policies. Furthermore, albeit with different nuances, they both see this as an almost anthropological identity crisis, the result of Western history reaching the end its boundaries. Do you agree with this analysis?
At times there are ways of presenting these phenomena that are useful for clarifying some of the problems’ fundamental terms. I believe that the metaphor of the wild free market answers these requirements. However, today’s world seems to me anything but a place dominated by the market’s free powers. Does this perhaps apply to China? Or Gazprom? Or sovereign funds? The global world actually mixes an ensemble of free trade and domination by monopolies, private enterprise and state input. All this in increasing and over expanding disorder. When the Berlin Wall fell and Francis Fukuyama made the mistake of believing that history was over, the prevailing idea in the West was that the world would move towards converging economic and political order, marked by our own values. This did not happen. On the contrary, power has moved towards other parts of the world, and today this mix is seeing the addition of other inputs that are not only related to economics but to cultural and value-linked elements, the expression of universes differing from ours. This is why the theories expressed by Attali and Tremonti do however make sense. They invite us not to passively suffer these processes.
Italy recently protested with the WTO about the introduction of rice, potato and citrus fruit cultivations among tax-exempt tropical products. Is globalisation without reciprocity fair? And if this is not fair was this a tactical error by Europe?
I don’t know what the world would be like if a giant like China had been excluded and left to participate in world trade as an illegal participant. My friend Giulio should bear in mind this question. The issue more simple concerns the quality of negotiations and the mistakes made in specific negotiations. It also concerns the relations – at time ignored – between free trade and exchange rates. A great deal of the imbalance we are experiencing is not to be blamed on the WTO, but rather on China’s entry and that of others with different exchange rules. Regards to China, the manner in which its currency is linked to the dollar has ended up contributing to America’s trade deficit, furthermore resulting in reserves giving Beijing advantages transformed into unprecedented competitiveness.
Was there not however a lack of gradualness in the trade liberalisation process?
That depends on one’s point of view. If I were non-European I could answer that there is a significant amount of gradualness, to the extent that there are still agricultural subsidies in the United States and in Europe.
Do you not think that globalisation has overturned certain categories of economic theory, and that therefore liberalism today is the reference point for the reformist left, while a certain Colbertism is that of the moderate right?
This is what Tremonti says, and I understand why. He feels the need to reduce the right’s level of liberalism and direct it towards a perspective involving a greater role played by the state. So what is the solution? He says that free market is a left-wing doctrine and in this way encourages the ‘right’ to distance itself. Frankly, however, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher contributed more to the great season of economic liberalism in the world than the left ever did. Furthermore it is still not always easy for the left to accept the market’s rules. That said, part of the ‘right’ has always been statist and protectionist.
So as to speak with one voice, does Europe need a shared civil identity based on shared values, or rather is this spiritual profile too an ideological tool that is not in reality corroborated by populations?
A great contemporary philosopher, Jurgen Habermas, believes that a shared European identity must be found in the missions we can accomplish together. If we search for it in values and traditions, we run the risk of not finding it. Personally I share the idea expressed by Bronislaw Geremek and others, stating that our cultural identity exists, but it is not an unquestionable fact, but rather a task we must want to address, ensuring that our shared characteristics overcome our diversities. This reminds me of the words of a great Hungarian, Istvan Bibò, about the importance of identities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, inhabited by small nationalisms involved only in laying claims, stating prerogatives and emphasising distinctions. There is evidence of this in some of Europe’s new members, who are the children of this culture, not to speak of the Western Balkans, still the symbol of this European attitude to increase divisions. In spite of all this, shared factors do exist and they have resulted in a European identity largely based on human rights, and, like it or not, that owe a great deal to the Christian traditions.
Traditions to which Habermas himself assigns a fundamental role, that of representing a preservation of the sense of democracy, justifying and strengthening the consensus procedures on which they are based.
Yes, and it is perplexing that he denies a constitutional patriotism founded on culture and values, and yet he acknowledges the role played by religions. It is undisputable that the culture of human rights has come about in Europe as the Medieval processing of Canon Law and was then passed down in public law. On the other hand, the idea that we all have of equal rights is inherent in Christianity.
Is this proof, as Paolo Prodi states, that Enlightenment too has a filiation relationship with Christianity?
If one only superficially observes historical events then one can deny this relationship. There is no doubt that the Counter-Reformation is the opposite of Enlightenment. This however does not obliterate the fact that it was the Christian culture that introduced human rights.
Do you also mean that acknowledging Europe’s Christian roots in the new Constitution would be legitimate and necessary?
If we wish to proclaim them so as to mark a border with those who are the children of other roots and distance them more easily, then one should actually deny them. Christian roots assume meaning if they are instead understood as the expressive form of an inclusive Europe founded on human rights.
How long will it take to ratify the Lisbon Treaty?
I am not so sure it will be possible before the 2009 elections. However, we should bear in mind that the Irish are one of the most pro-Europe people existing in Europe. 75% of those who voted ‘no’ to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty actually wished to negotiate a better agreement. There must be a solution.
Hence there is no need for variable geometries, a two-speed Europe in which some countries lead and others follow?
Threatening an avant-garde when there are some at the back of the group who do not wish to move forward is a card one can play, it is part of the negotiation process. Furthermore I believe that stimulating avant-gardes can be useful even after approving this Treaty. That is how Europe has taken its most important steps forward. For instance the introduction of the Euro, the Schengen Treaty on free circulation for citizens. What matters is not losing one’s direction. And direction is provided by the Lisbon Treaty.
The French Presidency has filled the political void marking the end of a unipolar world by joining in Middle Eastern diplomacy with the idea that, faced with the planet’s new geopolitical balance, this would re-launch the role played by Mediterranean Europe. Early success seems encouraging. Should we trust this process?
I like Sarkozy’s Gianburrasca-like taste, hence the taste of man who has more ideas than he can handle. In the meantime however he has these ideas. I consider his project a noble adventure to be encouraged, because it goes beyond the vision established in Barcelona during the Nineties that is now inadequate. Free trade is an insufficient bridge between the shores of the Mediterranean, separated by such profound divisions. It will take a great deal more to establish a real relationship with Africa and the Middle East. Immigration tragedies confirm the need for more complex relations.
Has Italy lost its Europeanist enthusiasm? Recent restrictions on immigration, and the decision to take a census of the Roma using fingerprints, have resulted in powerful reactions only partly controlled by European diplomacy. Is Italy running the risk of becoming isolated?
I hope not. The majority coalition includes an anti-immigration party, an element that unfortunately emphasises positions present among voters, and it does so assuming stands that certainly place us against the current European trend. This same coalition, however, if it does what it says it will do, should prove sensitive to religious aspects that in this sense are going in the opposite direction.
Is this a comforting compensation?
I would call it a counterthrust that could in the end avoid lacerations. Of course damaging things have happened. The effects of the fingerprint census for one single group are among them. They have however been diluted by the decision to order digital fingerprinting for everyone, Italians and foreigners, starting in 2010. This is an idea – and the Foreign Minister Frattini knows this well – taken into consideration for some years now also at a European level.
In relations with Europe, what importance is attributed to the internal conflict in the Italian political system and the problem there is in defending and ensuring the fruitfulness of a dialogue through which our country can implement a series of institutional reforms approved by everyone?
This has always been a restraint. In Europe a divided country is always seen by definition as an uncertain interlocutor, a country one can rely on less than others for consensus, and hence contribution for certain solutions.
Ernesto Galli della Loggia and Paolo Pombeni indicate divisive moralism as one of Italy’s traditional evils, in which, ever since the days of Crispi and Giolitti, identity coincides with ideological conflict, with the delegitimization of the opponent. Do you agree with this analysis?
Ideological conflict is a very divisive element. And moralism can be divisive too. I do not however think that these are the cause of division in Italy. The fact is that we have always had an unaccomplished nation, since we have not created a strong national identity, capable of standing up to internal political counter-positions thanks to a solid platform of shared values. Italians do have a collective identity, the result of a historical process, and it is clearly recognisable. But it has not resulted in a national identity, which is different, because this is a process achieved starting from above. It is the elites that using elements of collective identity ensure that all citizens recognise themselves within a shared national mission. This was done by the French monarchy which created the national state. The Prussians did this in Germany. A number of kings did this in the United Kingdom and the Spanish monarchy has certainly done it. The Savoias did not manage to do this.
Do you mean that it is not true that the Italians have the government they deserve, but rather that they have not yet had a ruling class worthy of them?
They have not had a ruling class capable of permanently involving them. The Italians’ ancient mistrust of elites is proof of this and in part it is also reciprocated.
Translation by Francesca Simmons