Roberto Biorcio teaches sociology at the Milan Bicocca University. Among the books he has published, "La Padania promessa" (Il Saggiatore 1997) and "Political Sociology" (Il Mulino 2003).
Many observers were astonished by the Northern League’s great electoral success, a party that collected 17% of votes in Italy’s northern regions. The “northern issue” has returned to play an important role. One discovers that many trade-union members (even members of the CGIL) voted for Bossi’s party; and also that in many parts of the country the Northern League took away representation of the lower classes from left-wing movements. The dynamics and phenomena that have developed in the Northern Regions are however very similar to those already seen (at times even more powerfully) during the Nineties. On the other hand, in many way the Northern League seems to remain unchanged, with a political identity and a number of key slogans (against “Rome Ladrona”, “Rome the robber”, immigrants and crime) we have been familiar with for over twenty years. One could say that during these recent elections there was a “third wave” of the Northern League’s electoral successes; this new wave shares many characteristics with previous ones, but also significant novelties, as it took place in a very different political and social framework, and after a decade of stagnating consensus.
The first two Northern League waves
The first wave took place in 1992: the political party led by Umberto Bossi, for the very first time won 17.3% of votes in the northern regions, causing a crisis with the DC (Christian Democratic Party) and its allies, effectively resulting in the ultimate crisis of the First Republic. The Northern League had managed to massively channel and exploit tensions existing between the people and the political classes, making good use of expressions, opinions and prejudices widespread among the working classes and addressed against the Italian governing class. In 1994 the coalition between the Northern League and Forza Italia had won the elections, but it only lasted a few months. This alliance and new government responsibilities resulted in great problems. Bossi feared the subordination and dissolution of his party to the advantage of Berlusconi. This resulted in a decision to break away from the centre-right, even if losing positions of power and a number of members of parliament and senators. Bossi’s differences of opinion equally addressed both the centre-right and the centre-left ("Roma-Polo" and "Roma-Ulivo"), although his most ferocious attacks were reserved for Berlusconi.
The second wave of the Northern League’s success was achieved in the general election held on April 21st 1996; Bossi’s party collected over four million votes (20% of votes in the northern Regions amounting to 10.1% at the national level). The Northern League was however unable to transform this electoral success at a political and institutional level since its votes in Parliament were not useful to the Ulivo (left), and were not enough to guarantee a majority for the ‘Polo’ (right). To solve the problem, federalism was abandoned in favour of independence, campaigning for the creation of the "Po Valley Nation". Successes achieved by the Northern League in the early Nineties were not an isolated phenomenon in the international context. During that same period, in the more industrialised European countries, a series of political movements asserted themselves by repeating and reprocessing the fundamental points of historical populist movements – adapting them to present times and to various national contexts. Significant electoral success was achieved by movements such as the Vlaams Block led by the Flemish politician Dewinter, Haider’s Austrian Liberal Party (FPÖ), the Danish People’s Party (PPD) led by Pia Kjaersgaard, New Democracy in Sweden, the Progress Party in Norway, the Lega dei Ticinesi and the Union led by Blocher in Switzerland, and Le Pen’s Front National in France. These are very different political parties, but with profound similarities in terms of political identity and agenda.
Globalisation and the traditional representational systems
The merging of two distinct factors guaranteed the success of these parties in the various national contexts. The first consists in great and fast-moving changes caused by globalisation, which have caused widespread anxiety – among the people – with regards to satisfying primary economic, security and identity needs, increased by a fall in employment figures, the crisis experienced by welfare systems, immigration from Third World countries, an increase in organised and petty crime. The other factor was the crisis experienced by traditional representational systems; the main political parties no longer seem able to understand and represent – following guidelines involving competition and conflict understandable and credible according to public opinion – the requirements, issues, needs and values present in society. Populist leaders have effectively managed above all three kinds of campaigns: a) anti-politics, assuming positions of criticism, disaffection and alienation from the workings of democratic institutions and the main political players; b) the mobilisation of hostility as far as non-European immigrants are concerned; c) opposition to the process of European unification.
The electoral success of populist movements has always been accompanied by a transformation of the social fabric experienced by its supporters: from support exclusively found in urban and rural lower middle-classes, to increasing influence among workers in metropolitan, urban and suburban areas. At its peak, Haider’s FPÖ reached its highest levels of approval among labourers (30%). The same applies to Le Pen’s Front National and it was in 1996 that the Northern League too achieved its highest level of approval among labourers in northern Italian Regions (31%). This, in many situations populist movements managed to replace left-wing parties in their political representation of lower-class voters, gaining consensus above all among workers. The traditional trade-unions maintained their capability to mobilise and represent workers as far as their economic interests are concerned, but, after the ideological crisis and the dissolution of worker parties’ organisational networks, left-wing political parties have found it increasingly hard to present credible political alternatives as far as representation is concerned.
The risk posed by normalisation
After 1996, the radicalisation of its position in favour of political independence for the North emphasised the Northern League’s isolation, reducing its influence on Italian politics. In the years that followed the party lost half its supporters and militants’ activism also diminished. To avoid the movement’s definitive political demise, a new alliance was formed. Projects for independence were reduced to a more tractable and manageable form of devolution. The Casa delle Libertà coalition won the 2001 general election. However, the balance of power between the coalition’s parties changed. Forza Italia became stronger while The Northern League weakened (8.1% of votes in northern Regions). Bossi lost consensus among the more radical voters, while electoral areas that in the past had voted for the Northern League were attracted by Berlusconi and by his party. Although it had lost many votes, The Northern League chose to be loyal to the policies of the governing coalition. This appeared to be the end of a political cycle, with the Party’s "normalisation" within the framework of the Casa delle Libertà. The Northern League was no longer the only and authentic representative of battles promoted in the past, and consequently there was a great reduction in its electoral power. On issues concerning security, the fight against crime and illegal immigration, the party suffered from competition provided by Alleanza Nazionale. The self-promotion of Forza Italia’s governors in northern regions overshadowed the Northern League’s work for autonomy from Rome, leaving the party little space and visibility.
During the years that followed, Bossi’s party remained in touch with the moods and needs of the population in the areas in which it had greater influence. Without weakening the alliance, and on the contrary maintaining a privileged relationship with Berlusconi, The Northern League still tried to present itself as a ‘partito di lotta’ [radical party ready to do battle – translator’s note], capable of representing the dissatisfaction and anger expressed by the northern regions. Old posters reappeared against “Rome Ladrona” and controversy regarding centre-right coalition parties more deeply rooted in the South also intensified. Consensus did not however improve in the 2006 elections. The alliance with the Movement for Autonomy led by Raffaele Lombardo – contradicting the traditional anti-Southern prejudice at the root of the Northern League’s identity – obtained good results only in Sicily (4.4% of votes); compared to 2001 matters did not improve in the northern regions. Trends indicating a rise in the numbers of votes seen in the 2005 regional elections were overturned. The referendum held a few months after the 2006 election on constitutional reform voted in parliament by the centre-right, and which envisaged the introduction of devolution (increased power to the Regions) was turned down by a large majority. For the Northern League this reform had been an inalienable condition for participating in the centre-right coalition.
Anti-politics and security
In the recent elections, votes for the Northern League suddenly doubled, returning to the levels of 1992 and coming close to those of 1996. Until a few months ago polls did not report a significant trend of this kind. There had however been a significant fall in consensus for the Prodi government and the ‘Unione’ coalition. A change of direction was taking place above all within one vast social sector – formed by workers, their families and pensioners with a past as workers – which in the 2001 elections had mainly voted for the ‘Casa delle Libertà’ and in 2006 had preferred the ‘Unione’. In these social contexts there had been an increasing perception of impoverishment and financial problems encountered in managing every day life. On the other hand there was also progressively more widespread social concern, the result of the arrival of increasingly large numbers of immigrants and innumerable episodes of petty crimes emphasised by the media.
Within this context and within the framework of its opposition to the Prodi government, the Northern League was able to implement a very effective campaign, simply by reactivating and strengthening its traditional agendas. Firstly it worked on anti-political feelings, albeit in a different way compared to the past: once the party attacked above all Rome, now it attacks the entire political caste and all its privileges. Faced with a massive increase in immigration, the Northern League was perceived as the most coherent and aggressive political party, capable of criticising even Berlusconi when he admitted the possibility of allowing immigrants with residency papers to vote in local elections. The Northern League on the other hand appears as the party most sensitive to increasing demands for security arising from globalisation’s impact on society. These issues are also extremely sensitive in regions such as Emilia and Liguria, territorial areas which have never experienced the traditions of a white sub-culture.
Presenting itself in the northern Regions as the only political party allied with the PdL, The Northern League was able to appear – within the centre-right – as the party addressing these issues in the most coherent manner and with greater force. Votes then came from many former supporters of Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale, and also recovering consensus from some who had formerly voted for the Unione. The Northern League’s third wave does however present significant differences with the previous ones. In 1996 the message had been far more radical and linked to independence for the Po Valley area. All references now are to the North as a territory to be represented in Rome. The Northern League speaks above all of fiscal federalism and its objective is to establish deep roots in the North, in the whole of the North, so a to represent its interests within a national state whose existence it no longer questions. For Bossi’s party it would be more important to have its own representatives appointed as governors of regions such as Lombardy or the Veneto Region than to have ministers in Rome. This would mark a historical event.
While many commentators emphasise the Northern League’s success among the working-class, the party’s leaders are instead trying to ensure it gains credit also as the representative of the middle classes, emphasising how a significant number of entrepreneurs in northern regions voted for the Northern League, unlike what happened in the Nineties. One cannot govern if one does not also represent the entrepreneurial classes in the northern Regions. It is no longer only the working class sector that is Bossi’s party’s reference point, and it has also abandoned its controversial attitude addressed in the past against the upper-middle classes. In recent years the party has seen the rise of a new class of leaders, involved in the administration of communes and provinces. A new class of administrators, who are not limited to issuing inflammatory slogans. Unlike 1994 and 1996, The Northern League’s alliance with Berlusconi seems far more solid. References to the past – such as the Basque or Flemish model – which tried to emphasise territorial autonomy to the point of independence, have now been dropped. The model pursued nowadays by the Northern League’s political class appears to be rather similar to the Bavarian one practices by the CSU – a solid alliance with a conservative party, such as the PdL, to encourage the progress of regional federalism.
Translation by Francesca Simmons