These divisions have made it difficult to implement and achieve the desired reforms and results quickly enough for the people to believe and support the transition. This has also allowed those who supported the old regime and who had benefited from it to begin to coalesce in various forms and to begin plotting for the failure of the democratic transition.
These divisions are found especially along the Islamic-secular divide. Each side represent roughly 40-50% of the population, although Islamists are mostly a united front (most of them are affiliated with al-Nahdha) while secularists are divided among more than 10 or 15 political grouping and tendencies. Many of then are of course united against al-Nahdha and many of them want the coalition-government to fail (except of course Attakattol and CPR who are part of the ruling coalition), but they are also divided along strong ideological, economic, social, and political fault lines. Bitter inner fighting among the secularist groups and parties and between them and al-Nahdha has led to rising tensions in the country and the weakening of national unity and dialogue and consensus. Strong feelings of fear and sometimes even hatred between hardcore Islamists and hardcore secularists have been developed over the more than 30 years of mistrust, corruption, oppression, and a fear industry cultivated by Ben Ali to keep Tunisians divided and fearful of each other.
Unlike Turkey or Egypt, neither side can impose its views or will on the other. The secularists cannot impose secular laws and the Islamists cannot impose Islamic laws. This is why al-Nahdha announced early on (in March) that it will not insist on mentioning Shariah as one of the sources of legislation in the new constitution. Discussions in the National Constituent Assembly have led to building consensus on many issues (rights of women, freedom of expression, rights of minorities, respect for Islamic values and the Arab/Islamic identity, etc..) but this has been an arduous and difficult process. The only point of divergence remains what kind of political regime will be chosen for Tunisia (parliamentarian system or presidential system) and on this issue Tunisians and political parties are still divided. A recent announcement by the ruling Troika declared that they have agreed on choosing a “modified presidential system” and a popularly-elected president, but it is clear that they remain divided on the specific oversight role and functions that will be granted to the president and his or her relations with the parliament and with the government. This remains a very politicized debate and is currently delaying the final stages in the drafting and adoption of the new constitution.
We have two powerful movements and tendencies, in Tunisia and in the Arab world: A strong religious movement whereby religion has become an extremely strong force and part of the identity of most citizens, and a very strong democratic movement which has convinced Tunisians (and generally Arabs) that development, prosperity, and dignity cannot be achieved without freedom and democracy. If these two strong forces collide, we will have violence and possibly even civil war in Tunisia, but if we are successful in bridging the gap between these two popular political and social movements, then we can build the basis for a genuine and lasting democracy. This will require the “internalization” of the values of human rights and democracy within Islamic values and culture. Common citizens must believe that democracy is not only compatible with Islam (and with their Islamic culture and values), it is the only political system that IS compatible with Islam. On this front, there is still a huge effort that is needed in order to convince the majority of the citizens that values of freedom, democracy, and human rights are indeed compatible with Islam, but this effort is often derailed or weakened by calls for certain freedoms that are still a matter of huge debate and controversy even in the West (such as pornography, homosexuality, prostitution, nudity, and disrespect for religious values and symbols). In my opinion, these hotly contested and debated issues must be postponed to a later date after the basic pillars of the democratic house are built and solidified, and in this respect, we must remember that neither Rome nor democracy were built in one day.
Finally, Tunisia has accomplished quite a lot in the past two years, but a lot more remains to be done. The next two to three years remain crucial in order to:
1. finish drafting and ratification of the constitution (hopefully with a 2/3 majority, which will not be easy) to hold free and fair presidential and legislative elections, hopefully within the next year,
2. adopt and implement a new law for the three permanent and independent High Councils (for election, for the judicial system, and for the media),
3. adopt a new law for transitional justice,
4. continue efforts to reform and clean up the security sector, the judicial system, and the media, which were the main pillars of the Ben Ali regime and which remain almost intact,
5. build more consensus, dialogue, and national unity between all Tunisians on these critical and crucial steps, and on how to protect and respect Islamic and democratic values and principles,
6. finally to try to provide some economic stability and growth, reduce poverty and unemployment, and give Tunisians, especially the youth, hope that a better future lies ahead so that they can be more patient towards these “democratic” instabilities and upheavals.
A very tall order indeed. I remain however optimistic that Tunisia will succeed, but this will more support from the United States and the European Union, who have a huge stake in the success of this democratic transition. They have not yet stepped up to the table and provided the necessary economic and financial support to help Tunisia along this very difficult path. I hope we will not all be sorry, two, three, or five years from now, that we missed a great historic moment to build peace, stability, democracy, and prosperity on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, in this vital and crucial region of the Middle East and North Africa.
For democracy to grow in the Arab world, it must first succeed in Tunisia. This means that the secular-Islamist coalition must be maintained, and that much stronger economic support and assistance must be provided to help Tunisia in this difficult and challenging transition.
*This article is a summary of a paper presented by Dr. Radwan Masmoudi, President of CSID at the ‘Pluralism and Democracy: Prospects for the Arab Middle East and North Africa’, organized by the European Council on Foreign Relations and the Council for a Community of Democracies, on Thursday December 6 & Friday December 7, 2012 in Paris, France.
Picture: Oqba Mosque in Kairouan (Wikimedia Commons)