The PKK supports the Kurds in Erbil
In the absence of an American plan for intervention in northern Iraq, the only choice left seems to be arming the Kurds, who have proved they are able to continue regular oil supplies in spite of progress made by ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant). This is a significant shift in Washington’s policy as far as Iraqi Kurds are concerned, and follows Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit to Iraqi Kurdistan soon after the start of the crisis. “Kerry’s visit was not unusual,” said Harriet Allsopp, a professor at the University of London (Birkbeck). “The United States has always been interested in maintaining territorial integrity in Iraq. A declaration of independence from Barzani would certainly not be supported by Washington. And yet the United States would have advantages if they treated Iraqi Kurdistan as an independent state rather than as a minority,” added Allsopp.
“Cooperation between Turkish and Iraqi Kurds is already significant, and there may be a military agreement and the creation of joint armed forces to protect the region. It would not be a political agreement, only a military one. For example, borders between Iraq and Syria could be opened, establishing a form of cooperation with the PKK. There is great potential at the moment for the Kurdish region becoming independent,” said Allsopp.
Iran instead is opposed to Iraqi Kurdistan becoming independent. “The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK which pursues an armed struggle for the independence of Iranian Kurds) has become stronger following the marginalisation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iran (KDP-I), and will certainly be involved should there be a conflict for Kurdish independence. The PKK and the Democratic Union Party in Syria could join if there were more organised support for the Iraqi Kurds,” added Allsopp.
Iraqi Kurds and Arab nationalism
In spite of the fact that the Shiite central government has marginalised Iraqi Kurds for ten years, the agreement between Baghdad and Massud Barzani’s autonomous Kurdish government for the moment appears to be the only way of containing the advance of ISIL’s jihadists, supported by elements of Saddam Hussein’s old regime. And so, the Kurds’ request for the formation of an autonomous state seems closer than ever before. In particular, Iraqi Kurds have been fundamental in the national construction process, and yet it is nothing new that Arab nationalism is opposed to the birth of a Kurdish state. Ever since modern Iraq was formed, minorities have been considered enemies, close to colonisers, in order to emphasise the qualities of Arab nationalism. The question of minorities was addressed in Iraq following a 1930 League of Nations request to safeguard their rights. The issue had already been critical since 1921, and ever since then the minorities (Assyrians, Kurds, Turkmens and Yazidis) were progressively excluded from the state’s political process.
It is, therefore, no surprise that Arab nationalism relied on rivalry with the Kurds, who are Indo-European and linked to Persia, in order to consolidate the new state’s ideology. Kurds challenge the notion of the country’s territorial integrity. In particular, Mosul’s Kurdish separatist movement fomented ideological opposition to Iraqi nationalism that wanted to avoid Kurdish independence at all costs. Such an event would have prevented Sunnis from continuing to lead the country with a continuous increase in the Shiite population.
Hence Iraqi nationalism was based not only on resentment of the British colonial authorities, perceived as an impediment to Iraqi self-determination, but also in opposition to British support for the minorities and the protection of their rights, perceived as part of a divide et impera preventing the development of an autonomous Iraqi state. In fact, as a precondition for obtaining independence, Iraq had to prove to the League of Nations that is was safeguarding minorities. Nationalists considered this request an interference in national sovereignty, strengthening the idea that Great Britain was supporting Kurdish minorities to weaken the government in Baghdad. Thus the Kurds were excluded from the national ideology (for example, Kurdish was not taught in schools) while in the countryside the Kurdish tribal sheikhs (agha) were “bought” by authorities in Baghdad using mechanisms involving patronage inclusion. Also Kurdish independence aims made it necessary to strengthen the central army so as to guarantee the state’s security. Minorities too were included in the conscript army.
Once again, by arming the Kurds the international community is relying on a minority to recreate Iraq’s national identity. This time, however, the Iraqi Kurds seem ready to go all the way to achieve their independence, even if this might disintegrate Iraq as we know it.
Translated by Francesca Simmons