The better informed observers have come to the conclusion that the result of these elections were announced on November 12th 2008, when a review of the constitution was approved by the two chambers of parliament amending Article 74 of the 1996 Constitution that restricted presidents to serving two mandates. The real objective of this constitutional amendment, introduced five months before the election date, was obviously that of removing the constitutional obstacle preventing Mr. Bouteflika from maintaining his presidential appointment for one more mandate. Now nothing will prevent him from governing for the rest of his life, following the best traditions of the Arab world.

A few months before this “constitutional arrangement”, the three political parties in the presidential alliance, the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale, the old single party), the RND (Rassemblement National Démocratique, created by the regime in 1997), and the MSP (Mouvement de la société pour la paix, a moderate Islamic party), supporting Bouteflika who has been in power since the 1999 election, did not make a mystery of their desire to amend the constitution so as to allow the current president to “pursue the execution of his programme and his efforts to develop the country.” In his speech made to Army officers on July 4th 2006, Bouteflika had already mentioned this amendment. At the time he indicated hope that all paths would lead to maintaining established order since the elections held on April 16th 1999.

The boycott led by the opposition

Having understood that the regime had chosen to ensure its stability, that the leader of the RND was associated to the “country’s stability”, the other players in Algerian political life (opposition parties, political personalities who were possible candidates having held key appointments in the government), correctly reached the conclusion that the cards have been dealt, and they only had one role left to play. They were obliged to legitimise an election already won by the regime’s candidate. So, Hocine Ait Ahmed, leader of the Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS), and Saïd Saadi, president of the Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie (RCD) denounced that they considered “ a coup the constitutional amendment of November 12th 2008” and announced that they would refuse to take part in it. According to Saadi, “a boycott has therefore become a duty, and even a patriotic necessity” (Le Monde March 9th 2009). The FFS instead spoke of a “re-consecration of Bouteflika.” The few political personalities suitable for the presidency, such as Mouloud Hamrouche, former leader of the government (1989-1991), Ahmed Ben Bitour, the leader of the government who served under Bouteflika for less than a year before slamming the door behind him, Taleb Ibrahimi, former Minister for Foreign Affairs and leader of the WAFA (not acknowledged), Sid Ahmed Ghozali, former Prime Minister and leader of the Front Démocratique (not acknowledged), Mokdad Sifi, also a former leader of the government, all instead refused to speak to the press. Mouloud Hamrouche, “a child of this system” and with the reputation of being a “reformer” advocating change, often reported how the 2004 Presidential elections had been held within a closed system. He considered it best not to say a word about the “events” of next April 9th.

During the 2004 election, those in power succeeded in organising a sort of “competition” when Ali Benflis, at the time head of the government under Bouteflika, ran in the presidential elections supported by one branch of the FLN and a few sectors and militants in civil society, with many believing that the Army had abandoned Bouteflika. Observers had spoken of “yet another of the usual closed elections.” Supported by satellite organisations consisting in the three parties of the presidential alliance as well as the state apparatus, Bouteflika won 84 % of votes, with participation reaching 57.78 %. It is expected that the election to be held on April 9th will show one of the lowest levels of participation ever seen in Algerian elections. There are two reasons that justify this hypothesis. First, the absence of candidates potentially capable of mobilising voters; secondly, the social despondency caused by the failure of economic and social policies implemented by the governments that have been in power during the last decade.

The five fake challengers

The five candidates who accepted to run for election have no really strong political and social standing, nor are they known for being suited to becoming the commander in chief . The best known of these five is Mme Louisa Hannoune, leader of the extreme left-wing and anti-globalisation PT (the Workers Party), which obtained 101 630 votes, equal to 1 %, during the last presidential election held in 2004. Fawzi Rebaine instead, leader of a little-known political party called AHD 54 (in favour of defending the values of the 1954 Revolution), came last in that same election with 0.6 % of votes. The three other candidates taking part in the presidential election for the first time have CVs that do anything but give rise to any hope of change within the Algerian electorate. They are Moussa Touati, leader of the Front National Algérien, a new party that caused surprise during the last general election held in May 2007 by winning six seats in the National Assembly; Mohamed Said, who recently set-up the Party of Freedom and Justice (not acknowledged), and Djahid Younsi, secretary general of the Islamist Party El-Islah (Mouvement de la réforme) and an advocate of an unconditional general amnesty.

Islamists have ‘fallen-out’

One should take note that the Islamists “choosing not to participate” (in opposition to Soltani’s MSP, advocating as a strategic participation in the political competition), find themselves facing this election having broken ranks. The only Islamist leader capable to a certain extent of playing a role in this election, Abdellah Djaballah, was removed from the leadership of El-Islah after a long and bitter war against the enemy brothers in his movement. Regards to Djahid Younsi, representing El-Islah, observers believe he is not sufficiently charismatic to gather those still believing it is worth voting for the Islamists (moderates, former members of the ex-FIS and those who have recanted) well-aware that there are many among them who have already expressed themselves in favour of the current head of State.

For almost a year voters have had an idea regards to what the appointment on April 9th 2009 will be like. An election without change and without no contest. Since then they have not hidden their lack of interest. This lack of interest is the result of the levels of unemployment, now close to 13 % according to official data, and dissatisfied social needs. This problem is taken seriously by the authorities who are rushing to save the only thing still at stake: an honourable level of attendance, or rather “a good score for the head of state, worthy of Brezhnev-like traditions”, according to Said Saadi.

Aware of the importance of what is at stake, the government has launched a sensitising campaign to persuade the population “not to allow anyone else to decide for them.” The candidate president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has toured many of the cities in the country in the weeks leading up to the election campaign. He has decided the annulment of debts incurred in by farmer and amounting to an estimated 41 billion dinars, the creation of investment funds for 150 billion dinars, the payment of workers currently unpaid salaries, doubled scholarships for university students, invested 160 billion dollars over the next five years and promised the creation of 3 million jobs and the building of over one million homes. The three parties of the presidential alliance (FLN, RND, MSP) supporting the President with help from organisations and associations, called-upon to support those in power on each political election, have accepted the challenge and are campaigning for Bouteflika, the object being to save the election from a boycott that would damage the candidate president’s image.

A political and media supremacy

This situation is the logical conclusion of a decade characterised by power the wielding a firm hand on political life and the media. The political parties of the presidential alliance have replaced the old single party and the so-called “civil society” organisations have replaced the old mass organisations. As far as the other political parties and associations are concerned (independent ones), they are deprived of the means that could allow them to impose themselves on the political stage and also as an alternative to the established order. This is also the result of the very timid evolution of the Algerian political system that remains closed in spite of a young democracy allowing for the creation of political parties, associations and private newspapers. This system organises “pluralist” elections with no chance of change. By forming an alliance with the regime’s main political forces, and when necessary the army, President Bouteflika (following Abdelhamid Mehri’s formula) has strengthened his power at the head of the state to the detriment of an open political life allowing the emergence of alternatives.

Bouteflika however still has to address his own failures. Firstly a non-productive economy, dangerously dependent more than ever on income from hydrocarbons. These have fallen by over 60 % since the summer of 2008, due to the brutal fall of the price of oil. This will have a very negative impact on job creation plans and the satisfaction of social needs that are clearly increasing. One must bear in mind that since 1999 Algeria has invested about 160 billion dollars in the economy, mainly in basic infrastructures, but the results of these investments are slow in providing tangible improvements, Secondly, peace is threatened by the “residues of terrorism.” Terrorism has been defeated, but total peace has yet to be achieved. National reconciliation policies started by Bouteflika are also slow in showing results.

Another issue present in the election as it is outlined, is that the Algerian regime seems far from being an exception in Arab regimes dominated by life-long leaders, and this, in spite of Algerian political life being perceived as the most dynamic in the region. Arab regimes have been successful in developing totalitarian means even within apparent democracies. This really is an iron hand in a velvet glove. They remain in power while tolerating certain “pluralist” activities, that are closely controlled so as not to upset the established order. The creation of a real process addressed at instating a real democracy is certainly not planned for the near future!

Mahmoud Belhimer is a columnist for the Algerian newspaper Echourouk.

Translated by Francesca Simmons