Tension is rising in Kosovo as the latest deadline – December 10 – for a decision on Kosovo’s undefined status approaches. Reflecting tiny Kosovo’s great international strategic significance, that decision point is also raising tension more widely: in the Balkans, inside the EU, and between the US and the EU, on the one hand, and Russia and Serbia on the other. On 10 December, a Troika of senior diplomats representing the EU, the US, and Russia and selected by the six interested powers — Italy, France, Germany, UK, US and Russia (the so-called Contact Group for the Balkans) – is to report its conclusions on Kosovo to the UN Secretary General following 120 days of discussions between Serbia and Kosovo.
The talks overseen by the Troika have made no progress and expert observers and EU and US officials do not expect them to produce a mutually acceptable agreement that will resolve the "Kosovo Question". Moscow clearly shares that assessment because it is calling repeatedly for more negotiations and warning of the dangers of a "unilateral" action. But to European and American eyes, more talks smacks of delay and seems pointless since the possibility of compromise seems beyond reach. Prishtina will accept nothing short of independence and Belgrade offers wide-ranging autonomy and draws the line at independence.
Resolving Kosovo’s status has already been delayed once following the UN Security Council’s inability to agree on UN Special Envoy Ahtisaari’s recommendations last spring. To do so again threatens to destroy what is left of the tattered credibility of the international community and Kosovo’s current leaders with the province’s population. Additional delay also risks more violence against both Kosovo’s 130,000 remaining Serbs and, this time, against the United Nations mission that oversees the province and perhaps even the 17,000 NATO troops posted there. Recently troops of the outlawed Albanian National Liberation Army have reappeared and the leader of the main Kosovo Liberation Army veteran’s association has threatened that veterans will take up arms if the Kosovo leadership fails to declare independence "immediately" after the December 10 deadline passes.
The historical roots
Thus, Washington and Brussels insist on the need to make a decision now. What that will be and how it will play out is unclear, even to the main actors. What is clear is that Kosovo is again a crisis point. To understand better that crisis, and its potential consequences for the Balkans and Europe, it is necessary to examine its history. The Kosovo crisis has been brewing for nearly a hundred years. It has its roots in the gradual departure of Kosovo’s Serb population and the growth of the indigenous Albanian population. The Albanians now make up more than 90% of Kosovo’s population, the Serbs three to five percent. Perhaps the most critical date in Kosovo’s history is 1913, when the great powers created an independent Albanian state following the first Balkan wars of the twentieth century. In their wisdom, the drafters of the London Treaty decided not to include Kosovo, where the majority of the populace was Albanian according to records of that time, in Albania but to hand it to Serbia. Serbia, had seized Kosovo from its Ottoman Turk rulers during the just concluded Balkan war.
That decision ensured that Kosovo became a flash point in the volatile Balkans thereafter and has bedevilled diplomats and statesmen trying to reconcile the unreconcilable throughout the Balkans since Dayton. Like Ultra Orthodox Jews who believe that God granted to the Jews the right to the entire territory of biblical Israel, many Serbs (including Prime Minister Kostunica) deeply believe that Kosovo, where many medieval Serbian kings are buried, cannot be abandoned, notwithstanding that Serbs began leaving Kosovo more than 300 years ago and now make up only a tiny fraction of its population. The Contact Group’s Troika, like former Finnish President Ahtisaari before it, has made a valiant effort to find a solution. It has scheduled two more meetings with the Serbs and Albanians, the first on November 20 in Brussels, the second six days later in Vienna, at which it has announced it will become more "proactive" by putting some "ideas" on the table. One is reported to be modelled on the 1972 FRG-GDR "Basic Treaty", by which West Germany recognized East Germany in all but law. However, both Belgrade and Prishtina made clear this week that they reject the troika’s bid to find a "neutral" solution.
The role of the United States
Thus Nothing is likely to come of these meetings, leading to another stalemate between the key international actors, US and the EU, on the one hand, and Serbia’s protector, Russia, on the other. However, unlike last spring, at least Washington appears unwilling to acquiesce in more delay. Angered by Moscow’s intransigence on Kosovo and Iran, its withdrawal from the treaty limiting conventional arms in Europe (CFE), continued Russian meddling in Ukraine and outright interference in Georgia, and skeptical of Putin’s interest in thawing out Russian relations with the US, Washington is now willing to ignore Moscow’s objections and recognize an independent Kosovo, according to senior US diplomats. Indeed, Nicholas Burns, the third-ranking official at the department of state, reaffirmed the US commitment to press for "supervised independence" in public comments on November 14.
Washington is seeking, however, to manage this process and is putting pressure on Prishtina not to move unilaterally but to coordinate its actions. Thus, it is likely is that Prishtina will declare unilateral independence, perhaps before Christmas. That will precipitate more crises, including perhaps inside the EU where there still is no consensus on Kosovo. In the absence of a consensus, British sources claim that perhaps as many as 22 of the EU’s 27 member-states will recognize Kosovo, but not until the spring or early summer. Thus, the US, Albania and perhaps Macedonia will be the only states to recognize Kosovo quickly. Croatia and Montenegro have signalled that they will wait and follow the EU’s lead.
The other crises
The most serious crises to be spawned by unilateral Kosovo independence will occur in the Balkans. Independence will prompt the flight of many of Kosovo’s remaining Serbs. Furthermore, independence will lead hardline Serbian nationalists in northern Kosovo to reject Prishtina’s authority and may even provoke them to declare the independence of their predominantly Serb patch of Kosovo adjacent to Serbia proper. Such a step would not only challenge Prishtina, but could also provoke attacks by Kosovo Albanian paramilitaries and the outbreak of serious interethnic conflict. Kosovo Serb rejectionism would also pose a severe challenge to the international authorities in Kosovo, including in particular NATO’s forces.
From a broader regional standpoint, Kosovo independence would pose a serious challenge to Macedonia’s fragile socio-political cohesion. Of more importance, Kosovo independence could provoke the collapse of the dysfunctional Bosnian state structure. Since the beginning of the year, Serbian Prime Minister Kostunica and his Bosnian Serb counterpart, Milorad Dodik, have hinted that Bosnia’s Serbian Republic might break away in the event of Kosovo independence. In recent weeks, Dodik and Kostunica have stepped up such rhetoric. The deepening political crisis in Bosnia, stemming from the Serbs unwillingness to agree to a joint police force, lends more gravity to Kostunica’s and Dodik’s threats.
Bosnia’s collapse would be a humiliating diplomatic defeat for Washington and Brussels, revive contentious border questions for Serbia and Croatia, and require the immediate attention of the US, the EU, and NATO, all of which are heavily engaged elsewhere and have few resources to spare. Kosovo independence would also have sharp consequences for Serbia. Kostunica has already made clear that Belgrade would not deal with the new state, including cutting existing trade and communications ties. Serbia would furthermore break off or downgrade relations with any state that recognizes Kosovo, further deepening Serbia’s isolation. Whether Kostunica would encourage the Serbs in northern Kosovo to declare independence or even oppose violently Prishtina’s efforts to impose its authority is unclear.
Serbia’s pro-Europe President, Boris Tadic, would be the biggest domestic political casualty of Kosovo independence. Tadic believes Serbia’s destiny lies in Europe, not in romantic ties with an increasingly authoritarian Russia. He is prepared to compromise on Kosovo but has been so skillfully outmaneuvered by Kostunica, with whom he is in coalition, that to oppose Kostunica’s hardline nationalist approach on Kosovo would be tantamount to committing political suicide. Distrustful of Tadic, Kostunica has made Tadic’s political future hostage to the decision on Kosovo by refusing to agree to presidential elections until after the Troika reports to the UN Secretary General, and then only if Kosovo’s status remains unchanged. If the US and EU agree to Kosovo’s independence, they sacrifice whatever prospect exists that Serbia will turn finally toward Europe.
The Russian reasons
While firmly opposing imposed or unilateral Kosovo independence, Russia has Held its cards close to the vest. Nevertheless, Moscow has prepared for that eventuality in the Caucasus. Well-informed sources there report, for example, that Moscow has put in place everything necessary for South Ossetia to declare independence and then unite with North Ossetia. Moscow may have taken similar steps in TransDniester. On the diplomatic front, it is clear that Moscow will use Kosovo independence to seize the moral high ground and profess its deep commitment to principle and international law. Moscow will not permit, however, its new found righteousness to deter it from doing practical business that suits its interests, whether with regard to Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea or the placement of an American missile shield in east central Europe. By refusing apparently to cut a "package deal" with the US on Kosovo in the context of other major bilateral or multilateral issues, Moscow has signalled that it is prepared to live with the current geopolitical situation.
With George Bush emasculated politically at home, the dollar collapsing and the US economy weakening, and US power overstretched abroad and short of friends, Putin sees no need to be cooperative. Kosovo independence will deepen Balkan instability, thus further tying down the US, EU and NATO. Moreover, unilateral Kosovo independence holds promise of provoking more division inside the EU and obstruct Solana’s efforts to lay a foundation for a common foreign and security policy, a strategic objective of Russian foreign policy. Likewise, unilateral Kosovo independence could provoke more friction between the US and the EU, another of Moscow’s strategic goals. Finally, independence will also make Serbia more dependent on Russia and perhaps enhance Russian influence in southeast Europe.
In sum, Serbia’s loss may translate into significant diplomatic gain for Russia. The biggest losers would be Serbia and its neighbors. Serbia would find itself farther than ever from Europe, dependent on Russia’s opportunistic diplomatic support, and short of good neighbors. Serbian hostility to Kosovo would sustain tension between the two neighbors as well as contribute to continuing instability in the region by forcing other Balkan states to choose between the two.